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Note
Nichol v. Stass: Ending Predictability for Foster
Parents in the Law of Sovereign and Parental
Immunity
Sarie E. Winner*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jonathan Nichol was one of 486,000 children removed from his
natural parents and one of the forty-nine percent placed in some type of
temporary care across the United States in 1995.1 He was two years old
when he died, becoming one of 977 children across the nation who died
from maltreatment, abuse or neglect. 2 Jonathan drowned in a toilet in
the home of his foster parents, John and Bonnie Stass.3 The facts of
both Jonathan's entrance into the foster care system and the exact
circumstances surrounding his death are unknown. 4  Despite this
uncertainty, it is clear that when the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services ("DCFS") removed Jonathan from the home of his
* J.D. expected May 2002. I would like to thank the members and editors of the Loyola Law
Journal for all their helpful technical and substantive comments throughout the writing and
editing process. I would also like to thank my friends and family, and particularly my husband,
Stan Keller, for their support throughout the entire process.
1. MICHAEL R. PETIT & PATRICK A. CURTIS, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A LOOK AT THE
STATES: 1997 CWLA STAT BOOK 72 (1997).
2. Id. at 52; see also Editorial, Foster Homes ... or Warehouses?, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 2000,
§ 1, at 22, available at 2000 WL 3695892 (discussing the problem of abuse and stating that "[tihe
vast majority of incidents of foster home abuse or neglect occur in homes with four, five, six or
more foster children in foster homes ... [and] it is up to licensers from the state child-welfare
department or private foster agencies to determine how many children each parent can handle.
But because the licensing process doesn't always provide enough contact or follow-up to assess
that, they often are wrong") [hereinafter Foster Homes... or Warehouses?].
3. Aaron Chambers, Justices Asked to Pierce Foster-Parent Shield, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
May 19, 1999, at 1.
4. Id.
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natural parents, Gregory and Ruby Nichol, it intended to prevent future
harm, not to facilitate his death.5
Decisions affecting foster care, as shown through statistics, have the
potential to impact thousands of families and children. Statistics
released by DCFS indicate that Illinois currently has 30,354 children in
some form of foster care.6 Further, DCFS reported 21,104 instances of
child abuse, of which foster parents perpetrated 138. 7 The Child
Welfare League of America's 1995 statistics show that of the fourteen
reported national fatalities to children in substitute care, three occurred
in Illinois. 8
One of the fatalities that occurred in substitute care was that of
Jonathan Nichol. A suit was filed against the Stasses in response to
Jonathan's death. When the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court,
the issue centered on whether foster parents may be relieved of liability
through application of either sovereign immunity or parental immunity. 9
5. I11. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., Child Protection, available at
http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/INPRO.HTM (last modified Sept. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Child
Protection]. The mission statement of DCFS states, in pertinent part: "The Department of
Children and Family Services shall, upon receiving reports made under this Act, protect the best
interest of the child, offer protective services in order to prevent any further harm to the child and
to other children in the family, stabilize the home environment and preserve family life whenever
possible." Id. T 2.
6. Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., Children Placed in Substitute Care (2000), at
http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/livl.pdf. These figures reflect that 14,491 children were placed in
departmental or private foster care in fiscal year 2001. Id. The most current DCFS statistics
available only counted the number of children in care as of October 30, 2000. Id. Numbers from
prior years may be more reflective of how many children will pass through the foster care system
at the end of the year. Id. For example, at the end of fiscal year 1999, 39,067 children were in
foster care. Id. In 1997, 51,331 children passed through the foster care system. By the end of
1997, 37,960 remained in care. Id. Statistics released by DCFS indicate that at present there are
4,404 DCFS licensed foster homes able to provide care for up to 10,904 children. Ill. Dept. of
Children and Family Servs., Licensing State Data (2000), at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/
licen1.pdf. Not included in this number are just over 600 foster homes awaiting DCFS license
approval. Id. Additionally, private agencies have 16,640 licensed foster homes able to provide
care for up to 45,499 children. Id. Not included in this number are just over 3,000 licenses
awaiting approval. Id.
7. Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., Child Abuse and Neglect Statistic Annual Report-
Fiscal Year 1999, at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/CANTS99Cont.htm. Not included in the above
number are 2,794 instances of sexual abuse, of which foster parents perpetrated eleven. Ill. Dept.
of Children and Family Servs., Indicated Sex Abuse Reports Perpetrators (2000), at
http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/CANTS99T25.htm#Table25. See generally Michael B. Mushlin,
Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Children from Abuse and
Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 205 (1988) (providing general information on
situations in which foster parents have been the perpetrators of abuse and cases that have
questioned whether this is a violation of foster children's constitutional rights).
8. PETIT & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 54 tbl.2.2: Maltreatment Related Fatality Cases, 1995.
9. Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 584 (11. 2000).
Nichol v. Stass
The majority concluded that the Stasses could not receive the benefit of
sovereign immunity.' 0 The majority also held, however, that foster
parents could receive some of the benefits conferred by parental
immunity. I
This Note begins with a discussion of relevant Illinois statutory law
and the level of control the state maintains over foster parents.' 2 Next,
this Note reviews a brief history of case law in Illinois and other
jurisdictions that have addressed whether sovereign immunity applies to
foster parents. 13 This Note then presents a brief review of the history of
parental immunity, including case law in jurisdictions that have
addressed the application of parental immunity to foster parents.' 4
Next, this Note examines the case of Nichol v. Stass, including a
discussion of both the majority and dissenting opinions. 15  This Note
then argues that the majority in Nichol correctly decided that foster
parents are not entitled to sovereign immunity. Further, this Note
argues that foster parents should maintain an independent duty to the
foster children in their care. It will also argue that the majority
incorrectly decided that foster parents are entitled to parental
immunity. 16 Next, this Note argues that the dissent correctly concluded
that the accepted principles of parental immunity are not applicable to
foster parents. 17 This Note then argues that denying foster parents the
protection of sovereign and parental immunity is based on sound
policy. 18 Finally, this Note will show that accepted principles of
"reasonable care" should be imposed upon foster parents and also the
positive effects of holding foster parents to this higher standard. 19
10. Id. at 587.
11. Id. at 590-91; see also infra Part II.C (discussing the reasoning employed by the court to
arrive at its holding).
12. Infra Part II.A (discussing Title 89 of the Illinois Administrative Code, which establishes
the intricate rules and regulations imposed upon foster parents by the state).
13. Infra Part II.A.
14. Infra Part II.B.
15. Infra Part III (discussing in detail the reasoning and holding of Nichol v. Stass).
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Infra Part IV (arguing that the court properly considered the question of sovereign
immunity and incorrectly designated foster parents as candidates for parental immunity).
18. Infra Part IV (discussing that denying sovereign and parental immunity can only
encourage more qualified foster parents to continue to offer their homes and discourage those
individuals who are only minimally qualified from continuing to act as foster parents).
19. Infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND
Since the foster care system's inception in the early twentieth
century, foster parents have played an important role.20  Despite this
important role, foster parents' legal rights and parental status remain
unclear. 21 Throughout the development of the foster care system, the
state has subjected foster parents to intense regulation while questioning
their status as non-parental caretakers. 22 While statutes have attempted
to resolve whether foster parents are entitled to immunity either as state
employees or as individuals standing in loco parentis, foster parents'
rights remain ambiguous. 23
A. Sovereign Immunity and Foster Parents
DCFS is a state agency vested with the duty to safeguard the interests
of children in Illinois. 24 To complete this duty, DCFS must investigate
all reports of child abuse or neglect. Moreover, DCFS must take a child
into protective custody if he or she is in immediate risk of harm.25 Once
the child is taken into protective custody, DCFS may require a foster
parent to assume responsibility for the child until he or she is either
returned home or released for adoption.26 When a foster parent assumes
20. Michael J. Buflin, Note, The "Reasonable Efforts" Requirement: Does it Place Children
at Increased Risk of Abuse or Neglect?, 35 U. OF LOUISVILLE J. OF FAM. L. 355, 355 (1996).
The mission statement of all child welfare agencies must be to reunite the natural family and
some of the resultant rights granted to foster children. Id. at 359. For example, according to the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and an Illinois case, Suter v. Artist M., the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not create a private right of action against the
state for the failure to use reasonable efforts to reunite the natural family. Id. at 368 (quoting
Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 354 (1992)). In another case, the United States Supreme Court
defined foster care as "a child welfare service which provides substitute family care for a planned
period of time when [the child's] own family cannot care for him for a temporary or extended
period." Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 823 (1977).
21. Infra Parts II.A, B (discussing the varying Illinois and nation-wide decisions on the
questions of both sovereign immunity and parental immunity).
22. Infra Parts II.A (discussing the relevant sections of the Illinois Compiled Statutes and
Illinois Administrative Code), I.1B (discussing foster parents' status as non-parental caretakers
appointed by the state).
23. Infra Parts II.A (discussing the effect of foster parents being named as state employees in
particular sections of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, but not in other sections), H1.B (discussing the
definition of in loco parentis and its potential application to foster parents); infra note 93 and
accompanying text (discussing in loco parentis).
24. In re C.J., 652 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ill. 1995). The court stated that, "DCFS ... is a
legislatively created agency charged with the duty to protect and promote the welfare of children
of Illinois." Id.; see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 (1998) (mandating the creation of DCFS
and detailing the purposes of the agency).
25. Child Protection, supra note 5.
26. Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., Adoption, at http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/
ADOPTmain .HTM (last modified Nov. 22, 2000).
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the role of caretaker, it is unclear whether he or she qualifies as a state
"employee."
1. General Principles of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity precludes suits against the government and its
employees. 27  The state, however, cannot use the theory of sovereign
immunity to avoid liability if its employees or independent contractors
are regulated.28 In fact, the state may be subject to a type of strict
liability29 when the duties of the employee or independent contract are
mandated by statute.30 Foster parents must abide by state regulations
imposed to ensure the safety of children placed in the foster care
system. 3 1  These regulations maintain certain duties of the state to
children who are removed from their natural parents' home.
32
Therefore, when the state employs the foster parent, it is not relieved of
liability. 33
Illinois sets forth a variety of laws to control the foster parent-child
relationship. 34  For example, the "Foster Parent Law" provides foster
27. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 753 (7th ed. 1999); see also generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 214, 251 (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 339, 343,
343B, 424 (1965). While not necessarily the established law of any state, the Restatements of the
Law invariably provide a solid basis upon which to gain an understanding of a particular area of
the law. Cases that have addressed the question of whether foster parents are entitled to sovereign
immunity, particularly Nichol v. Stass, have drawn from the Restatements of both Torts and
Agency. Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 588 (I11. 2000).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424.
29. Strict liability is defined as liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to
harm, but is based in the breach of an absolute duty to make something safe. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 926 (7th ed. 1999).
30. The Illinois Appellate Court has cited the comments to section 424 of the Restatement as
accurate statements of the law in Illinois. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Reliance Elevator Co., 733
N.E.2d 874, 881 (Il. App. Ct. 2000) (discussing a section of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions
that imposes certain duties upon the owner of land to remedy known defects and/or reasonably
foreseeable causes of injury).
31. Swanigan v. Smith, 689 N.E.2d 637, 642 (I11. App. Ct. 1998); see also infra Part II.A.2
(discussing the facts of the Swanigan case and the court's reasoning in that case).
32. Wallace v. Smyth, 703 N.E.2d 416, 420 (I11. App. Ct. 1998). The court stated that "DCFS
has legal and financial responsibility for children of whom it is guardian, regardless of their
momentary location." Id.; see also infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the facts and reasoning of the
court in the Wallace case).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 424, cmt. a. The comment to section 424 states
that "this section applies whenever a statute or administrative regulation imposes a duty upon one
doing particular work to provide safeguards or precautions for the safety of others. In such a case
the employer cannot delegate his duty to provide such safeguards or precautions to an
independent contractor." Id.
34. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-15 (1998); see also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402 (2000).
For the specific Illinois statutes, see infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory
sections relevant to determining the whether foster parents are entitled to sovereign immunity).
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parents with a distinct set of rights and rules, such as the right to be
treated as professionals and the right to reimbursement, thereby
ensuring that foster parents in Illinois are given uniform treatment. 35
Further, Illinois creates licensing standards. 36  The Illinois
Administrative Code details the licensing standards for foster family
homes including foster parents' duties and responsibilities.37 The
Administrative Code also requires DCFS to provide training for all
foster parents, either by DCFS directly or through a private child
welfare agency that has received accreditation for training.38  Many of
the Administrative Code regulations do not allow foster parents to use
See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 671 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000). For example, federal law mandates that
foster parents receive maintenance payments in return for their services and care of foster
children. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a). The United States Code states that "[i]n order for a state to be
eligible for payments ... it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which-(I) provides for
foster care maintenance payments." Id.
35. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/1(b) (1998). "Employees" for the purpose of this act include
"individuals who serve as foster parents for the Department of Children and Family Services
when caring for a Department ward." Id.; see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-10 (1998)
(defining "child welfare team" as those people who provide care under the Children and Family
Services Act; "department" as the Department of Children and Family Services; and "foster
parent" as a person licensed under the laws of the State of Illinois to care for children who
removed from the care of their natural parents and placed in the protective custody of the State of
Illinois); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-15.
While section 520/1-15 provides a list of fourteen distinct rights and responsibilities, the first
sentence of the statute also states that foster parents' rights are not limited to the fourteen
enumerated rights. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-15. The relevant enumerated rights include: (1)
Foster parents should be treated as a professional members of the child welfare team, id. § 520/1-
15(1), and (2) Foster parents can receive reimbursement for all expenses related to the treatment
and care of the foster child placed in their home, id. § 520/1-15(4).
The failure to include any right of foster parents to receive immunity, indemnification or
representation by the state for an action arising out of the role as a foster parent, the relatively
high frequency of suits against foster parents and the media attention they typically receive might
lead to a logical inference that the lawmakers did not want or intend to provide foster parents with
an unqualified right to claim immunity for torts against foster children.
36. See generally ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402 (2000) (providing the specific acts required
by the state if an individual chooses to participate in the Illinois foster care system as a foster
parent).
37. Id.
38. Id. The Code states:
Complete application for foster family home license means a completed written
application form; written authorization by the applicant and all adult members of the
household to conduct a criminal background investigation; medical evidence in the
form of a medical report, on forms prescribed by the Department, that the applicant and
all members of the household are free from communicable diseases or physical and
mental conditions that affect their ability to provide care for the child or children; the
names and addresses of at least 3 persons not related to the applicant who can attest to
the applicant's moral character; and fingerprints submitted by the applicant and all
adult members of the applicant's household.
Id. The Code leaves little room for interpretation or flexibility in the application of its provisions.
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discretion in determining how to care for a foster child. 39 Examples
include the requirements of specific closet and dresser space as well as
ensuring that there are fire and emergency exits in the home. 40
Moreover, if foster parents obtain day care or babysitters for their foster
child, they must receive prior approval of DCFS or another supervising
agency. 4 1 While foster parents are responsible for the discipline of their
foster child, foster parents are limited in the manner and type of
punishment they can impose upon the foster child in their care. 42  The
provisions set forth in the Administrative Code exemplify how the state
maintains control over foster parents when foster children are placed in
their homes.43
In addition to statutory regulation, the common law imposes a duty
on foster parents to maintain their property in a safe condition.44 The
foster parent, as the controller of the child's environment, must
anticipate the child's actions, consider the fact that the child cannot
appreciate the danger, and take precautions to prevent any reasonably
39. See generally id. § 402 (removing all discretion from foster parents); infra Part II.B
(discussing the role of discretion in determining whether a non-parent satisfies the principles of
parental immunity and in locoparentis).
40. Id. § 402.8(h), (i).
41. Id. § 402.11 (d).
42. Id. § 402.21. Section 402.21 deals specifically with the extent to which foster parents can
discipline the children in their care. For example, it provides that:
c) No child shall be subject to corporal punishment, verbal abuse, threats or derogatory
remarks about him or his family.
d) No child shall be deprived of a meal or part of a meal as punishment.
e) No child shall be deprived of visits with family or other persons who have
established a parenting bond with him.
f) No child shall be deprived of clothing or sleep as a punishment.
g) A child may be restricted to an unlocked bedroom for a reasonable period of time.
While restricted, the child shall have full access to sanitary facilities.
h) A child may be temporarily restrained by a person physically holding the child if the
child poses a danger to himself or to others.
i) The personal spending money of a child may be used as a constructive disciplinary
measure to teach the child about responsibility and the consequences of his behavior.
Id. § 402.2 1(c)-(i).
43. See generally id. § 402.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 343, 343B (1965). Section 343 states that:
[A] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his
invitees ... if, but only if he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should expect that they [the invitee] will not discover or
realize the danger ... and fails to exercise reasonable care to protect against the
danger.
Id. § 343. Section 343B states that "[i]n any case where a possessor of land would be subject to
liability to a child for physical harm caused by a condition on the land if the child were a
trespasser, the possessor is subject to liability if the child is a licensee or an invitee." Id. § 343B.
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foreseeable injury. 45  The obligations imposed upon foster parents as
homeowners stand independent from any statutory duties. 46
2. Judicial Interpretation of Sovereign Immunity for Foster Parents in
Illinois
Granting foster parents sovereign immunity depends upon two
factors.47  First, it must be established that the foster parents are state
agents.48 Second, there must be a determination that the foster parents
are entitled to the protections of sovereign immunity. 49  Even if the
foster parents satisfy both factors, courts do not grant sovereign
immunity if the actions of the foster parents violate a statutory duty or
are beyond the foster parents' grant of authority. 50  Further, foster
parents who satisfy both factors do not receive representation from the
Attorney General if the lawsuit arises from an act or omission outside
the scope of the foster parents' employment. 5
45. Id. § 343B, cmt. b. Comment b to section 343B states that:
Where the child is not upon the land as a trespasser, but is a licensee or an invitee, the
possessor of the land is no less obligated to anticipate and take into account his
propensities to inquire into or to meddle with conditions which he finds on the
land ... and his inability to understand or appreciate the danger, or to protect himself
against it.
Id.; see also Sampson v. Zimmerman, 502 N.E.2d 846, 848-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). In Sampson,
the Illinois Appellate Court essentially adopted the entire Restatement. Sampson, 502 N.E.2d at
848-49. The only condition is that those dangers considered extremely obvious will not trigger
liability upon the possessor of the land. Id.
46. See Swanigan v. Smith, 689 N.E.2d 637, 642 (I11. App. Ct. 1998). According to the
Swanigan court the obligation to protect a foster child from harm is a separate issue from whether
the foster parent's employment required the care of the foster child. Id. The Swanigan court
stated that "[h]er [the foster parent's] duty of care extended to any child in her home without
regard to whether she was employed to provide care for that child." Id.
47. The grant of parental immunity is a separate issue from whether the individual claiming
immunity is a state employee or a foster parent. See generally Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240
(I11. 1990); Osborn v. Augsburger, 680 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Griffen v. Fluellen, 670
N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
48. See generally 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/1 (1998).
49. Infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the decisions of various Illinois courts on the question of
whether foster parents are entitled to protection from liability through the application of sovereign
immunity).
50. Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247. The court reasoned that "[slovereign immunity affords no
protection, however, when it is alleged that the State's agent acted in violation of statutory or
constitutional law or in excess of his authority." Id.
51. Id. at 1250; see also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/2(a). A reasonable assumption from this
principle is that once the Attorney General enters the case to provide representation, the state has
investigated the situation and determined that the act in question was within the scope of
employment for the purposes of indemnification and representation. See infra note 54 (discussing
how the State Employee Indemnification Act defines foster parents for the purpose of
indemnification and representation).
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One of the first cases to address the application of these principles to
foster parents was Griffen v. Fluellen.52 In Griffen, a space heater used
in a DCFS licensed foster home caused a fire and burned a child DCFS
had placed in the home. The child's mother filed suit on the child's
behalf, charging that the foster parent negligently performed the duties
assigned to her in the capacity of a foster parent.53 The Illinois
Appellate Court held that when it is clear that DCFS appointed the
foster parent and DCFS issued vouchers for expenses to the foster
parent, the foster parent should be considered an agent of the state.
54
The appellate court again took issue with foster parents as agents of
the state in Swanigan v. Smith.55 In Swanigan, eighteen-month-old
Cortez Swanigan sustained burns from hot grease that his foster mother
left within his reach.56 At the time of the incident, the foster mother
was licensed by DCFS and had three foster children in her care.5 7 The
court's analysis assumed that the foster parent in this case was a state
employee; therefore, the state could be liable. 58 While the Swanigan
court arrived at the same holding as the Griffen court, the Swanigan
court's rationale was markedly different. 59  The court in Swanigan
reasoned that the foster parent had a duty to the child not only because
52. Griffen v. Fluellen, 670 N.E.2d 845 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
53. Id. at 847. Absent from the suit were any claims that the foster parent violated the law or
acted outside the scope of her employment as foster parent, or any documents to prove that the
foster parent was an employee of the state. The defendant foster parent averred with both
parental and sovereign immunity. Id.
54. Id. at 85 1. In this case, both the Attorney General and a private attorney represented the
defendant. It was not clear whether the defendant foster parent was entitled to representation and
indemnification under the State Employee Indemnification Act. The relevant portions include:
1) the definition of "State" for the purpose of indemnification includes any department, agency or
other instrumentality created by the state; and 2) the definition of "employee" specifically
includes "individuals who serve as foster parents for the Department of Children and Family
Services when caring for a department ward." 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/1(a), (b). The court also
held that where there is a duty independent of state employment, the breach of that duty is not
protected by sovereign immunity. Griffen, 670 N.E.2d at 852. The court made this point in the
alternative and held that the defendant had not "breached a duty to [the foster child] that is
independent of her employment with the State thus preventing the attachment of sovereign
immunity and enabling the claim to be maintained in the circuit court." Id.
55. Swanigan v. Smith, 689 N.E.2d 637 (I11. App. Ct. 1998).
56. Id. at 640. The relevant facts cited by the court included that "[w]hile talking with
[another] child, defendant observed Cortez standing next to the sink. He reached for the bowl and
before defendant could stop him, he spilled the grease onto himself." Id. at 639.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 641.
59. Compare Swanigan, 689 N.E.2d at 641, 642 (where the Fourth District Appellate Court
granted sovereign immunity and also held that the foster parent had an independent duty to care
for the child), with Griffen, 670 N.E.2d at 852 (where the first district appellate court held that
DCFS licensing and issuing of vouchers was a sufficient basis for a grant of sovereign immunity).
2001]
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the foster parent was an employee of the state but also because she
owed the foster child a general duty of reasonable care in maintaining a
safe premises. 6°
In a situation similar to Griffen, the appellate court in Commerce
Bank v. Augsburger6' again addressed the issue of whether foster
parents are entitled to sovereign immunity. In Commerce Bank, three-
year-old Louise Osborn died from asphyxiation and hyperthermia after
being locked inside a closet by her foster parents. 62 The Commerce
Bank court held, contrary to the holding of Griffen, that there was no
basis for sovereign immunity. 63 The court distinguished its holding
from Griffen because the contract in Commerce Bank did not stem
directly from DCFS to the foster parents. 64 The court reasoned that the
relationship between the foster parents and the state was remote because
the state had very little control over the foster parents. Therefore, the
court held that the application of sovereign immunity was not
justified. 65 When foster parents are licensed by a private agency,
however, the question of sovereign immunity is still unclear.66
B. Parental Immunity Applied to Foster Parents
The concept of parental immunity is similar to that of sovereign
immunity. It provides protection from liability, contingent upon an
individual's status as a child's caregiver. 67  Parental immunity is a
60. Swanigan, 689 N.E.2d at 642. The court held that the foster parent's "duty of care was
without regard to whether she was employed to provide care for that child." Id. The court stated
that there was enough evidence to sustain the trial court's verdict; the implication being that the
duty the foster mother owed as a homeowner was not breached through the act of the leaving the
hot grease in a place accessible to a young child. Id.
61. Commerce Bank v. Augsburger, 680 N.E.2d 822 (11. App. Ct. 1997). Youth Services of
Mid-Illinois placed three-year-old Louise Osborn into the foster care of the Augsburgers. Id. at
823. There are two distinct cases based on the actions of the Augsburgers, both questioning the
foster parents liability for the events surrounding Louise Osbom's death. See also infra notes 97-
101 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the other Augsburger case).
62. Augsburger, 680 N.E.2d at 823-24. The court considered the fact that "the child died in
the Augsburgers' home from asphyxiation and hypothermia when the Augsburgers confined her
in an enclosed space described as 'the upper half of a divided shelf with the door closed."' Id.
63. Id. at 824.
64. Id. The court differentiated Augsburger from Griffen, where the foster mother had been
directly hired by DCFS, in stating that "[n]o case has been called to our attention in which a party
so attenuated from the state, as the Augsburgers were here has been held to have governmental
immunity." Id.
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (discussing specifically the Commerce
Bank case, in which the foster parents were licensed by a private agency).
67. Infra Parts II.B. 1-2 (discussing the origins and current meanings of the concept of parental
immunity).
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slightly broader concept than sovereign immunity. 68 Parental immunity
allows a non-parent to receive the protection of parental immunity
through the application of the concept of in loco parentis,69 while an
individual can only receive sovereign immunity through an established
relationship with the state. 70 The result is that foster parents, like those
in Nichol v. Stass, may seek the protection of parental immunity where
the protection of sovereign immunity is unavailable.
1. The General Principle of Parental Immunity and "In Loco Parentis"
Status
The grant of parental immunity for torts committed upon one's child
is a common law doctrine adopted through case law.7 1  While the
common law recognized the public policy of maintaining family
harmony, the actual doctrine of parental immunity arose out of
American case law beginning early in the twentieth century. 72  The
68. Compare supra Part II.A (discussing the basis for a grant of sovereign immunity), with
infra Parts II.B.1-2 (discussing the situations in which non-parents are granted parental immunity
for injuries for children in their care).
69. In loco parentis is "to act as a temporary guardian of a child or the supervision of a young
adult by an administrative body such as a university." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 790 (7th ed.
1999); see infra Part II.B.I (discussing that courts use the term in loco parentis to mean a person
who temporarily stands in the place of a parent who is charged with a parent's rights, duties and
responsibilities).
70. See infra Part II.B.1.
71. See generally 4 FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE § 67.09 (Arnold H. Rutkin et al. eds., 2000)
(discussing the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity, the reasons why states throughout the
nation have adopted the doctrine and an explanation of how the doctrine has changed over time).
72. See Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 721 (Ill. 1993). In Cates, four-year-old Heather Cates
was visiting with her father when she was severely injured in a car accident. Id. at 716.
Heather's mother filed a negligence suit against her father. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the doctrine of parental immunity applied in situations where the parent was acting
within his authority and discretion. Id. at 729. In its discussion of parental immunity, the Cates
court refers to the three cases that established the doctrine of parental immunity as the "great
trilogy." Id. at 721. The "great trilogy" includes Hewellette v. George, McKelvey v. McKelvey
and Roller v. Roller. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891), overruled by Glaskox v.
Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992); McKelvey v. McKelvey 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903),
overruled by Broadwell by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994); Roller v. Roller,
79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905). In Hewellette, the court held a married daughter living apart from her
husband was not entitled to damages for injuries inflicted by her mother unless the rights and
duties inherent in the parent-child relationship did not exist and the daughter had not returned to
her mothers home. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887. In McKelvey, the court held that cruel behavior
inflicted upon a child did not provide a basis for suit and the parents, including the stepmother,
were immune from liability because the right of the parent to control the child comes from the
corresponding duty to maintain, protect and educate the child and includes the right to inflict
moderate chastisement. McKelvey, 77 S.W. at 664. The court further stated that only gross
misconduct could subject the parent to liability. Id. Also, in Roller, a father raped his fifteen-
year-old daughter and the court held that the daughter could not sue her father for damages
because such a suit was against public policy, as it did not encourage the preservation of harmony
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question of whether parental immunity is proper for non-parents
depends upon whether foster parents are granted in loco parentis
status.13  Throughout the development of the doctrine of parental tort
immunity, courts consistently have applied the principle not only to
natural parents of a child, but also to individuals granted in loco
parentis status.74 Although not mentioned in early cases, a fundamental
principle to recent cases questioning the appropriateness of parental
immunity for non-parents focuses on the concept of in loco parentis.75
Since its adoption in the early twentieth century, parental immunity
has evolved into two general approaches. 76  In the majority of
jurisdictions, the doctrine of parental immunity protects parents from
liability arising from actions that are either an exercise of parental
in domestic situations. Roller, 79 P. at 789. While these cases have since been overruled, they
provided the basis for the doctrine of parental immunity.
73. See supra note 69 (defining in loco parentis). Most states, including Illinois, have adopted
the same or similar definitions. See, e.g., Busillo v. Hetzel, 374 N.E.2d 1090, 1091 (I11. App. Ct.
1978); Gulledge v. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429, 431 (I11. App. Ct. 1977); Weinand v. Weinand, 616
N.W.2d 1, 6 (Neb. 2000); Miller v. Davis, 268 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Fox v.
Mission of Immaculate Virgin, 119 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952). In Gulledge, the trial
court held that grandparents were not entitled to parental immunity for the injury to their
grandchild while he was in their care. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d at 431. The court rationalized that
the grandparents did not stand in loco parentis, as their control over the child was temporary and
Illinois courts had failed to extend this rule beyond its limited boundaries. Id.; see also 4 FAMILY
LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 71, § 67.09 (explaining that parental immunity is typically not
extended to parties who are not in loco parentis and, further, that foster parents are not usually
considered to stand in loco parentis because of the different nature of the relationship and the
ability to terminate the foster parent-child relationship); E. Russell March III, Note,
Torts-Personal Injury-Doctrine of Parental Immunity Extended to Foster Parents Standing In
Loco Parentis for Claims of Simple Negligence: Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992), 23
CUMB. L. REv. 483 (1992/1993) (providing a history of the doctrine of parental immunity and in
loco parentis and applying the concepts to a 1992 case in Alabama that considered whether foster
parents were entitled to parental immunity).
74. Lawber v. Doil, 547 N.E.2d 752, 753-54 (I11. App. Ct. 1989). The court stated that
"immunity applies not only to the natural parents of the child, but also to those who stand in loco
parentis." Id. at 753 (citing Busillo, 374 N.E.2d at 1090); infra notes 92-93 (discussing the
Busillo case and the court's reasoning in that case).
75. Busillo, 374 N.E.2d at 1090; Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d at 429; see also infra notes 92-93
(discussing the facts and holding of the Busillo case, particularly the court's reasoning to deny
grandparents parental immunity and the attached in loco parentis status).
76. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 722. The Cates court stated that jurisdictions have either "(1) fully
abrogated the doctrine concerning all types of parent-child negligence and applied a standard
which limits actionable liability between parent-child; or (2) partially abrogated the doctrine with
respect to all types of parent-child negligence by carving out exceptions to its reach." Id.; see
also Samuel Mark Pipino, Comment, In Whose Best Interest? Exploring the Continuing Viability
of the Parental Immunity Doctrine, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1111 (1992) (discussing the history of
parental immunity, the expansion the doctrine has undergone and the present status of parental
immunity); supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Cates).
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authority or parental discretion.77 Parental discretion generally includes
providing food, clothing, housing, and medical and dental care. 78  The
minority of jurisdictions, including Illinois, take a piecemeal approach
in determining whether parental immunity is appropriate.79  These
jurisdictions apply the above stated general majority rule, but permit
exceptions to the general rule on a case-by-case basis.
80
2. Parental Immunity and In Loco Parentis in Illinois
Illinois courts first recognized and adopted the doctrine of parent-
child tort immunity in 1895 in Foley v. Foley.8 1  The Foley court
adopted the doctrine of parental immunity, reasoning that internal
family disputes and issues should not be resolved by the judicial
system. 82  Foley also addressed the question of whether the doctrine of
parental immunity should apply equally to natural parents and adoptive
parents. 83 The court determined that because all the benefits given to
natural parents are also given to adoptive parents when a child
permanently enters the home, the adoptive parent must be granted the
77. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 722 (citing Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963)). The
court summarized Goller as allowing "a child [to] sue his parent for negligent conduct except
where the conduct involves 'an exercise of parental authority ... or an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion."' Id. The Goller case involves a foster father's claim for immunity for the
injuries sustained by the foster son while riding on the foster father's tractor. Goller, 122 N.W.2d
at 198. The court held that the foster father was not relieved from liability under the parental-
immunity rule because the negligent act did not occur in either an exercise of parental authority
over the child or during an act involving an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect
to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. Id. at
198.
78. Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
79. See Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 723. In Cates, the court cited to a dissenting opinion of a prior
case, which stated that "the piecemeal approach, taken in this case ... can lead to nothing but
confusion." Id. (citing Cummings v. Jackson, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (I11. App. Ct. 1978)).
80. See id. An example of an exception to the general rule, as stated in Cates, is that parent-
child tort immunity does not apply when the parent is deceased because the policy reason
prohibiting parent-child suits no longer exists. Id. (citing Johnson v. Myers, 277 N.E.2d 778 (1I.
App. Ct. 1972)). A second exception is that grandparents do not qualify for parental immunity
because the family relations are too distant. Id. (citing Gulledge v. Gulledge, 367 N.E.2d 429 (I11.
App. Ct. 1977)).
81. Foley v. Foley, 61 111. App. 577 (1895). The relevant facts before the court were that the
child was in the care of his uncle, where he was beaten and sustained an injury to his arm that left
that arm crippled. Id. at 578.
82. Id. at 579. The court's reasoning included that:
[Tihe child cannot maintain a civil action for damages against its parents for such
injury. This rule of law, as the court conceives, is founded upon consideration of
public policy, affecting family government; that is, that the child shall not contest with
the parent the parent's right to govern the child.
Id.
83. Id. at 580.
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same rights as a natural parent.84  Despite the grant of parental
immunity to adoptive parents, the court concluded that if the injuries
sustained by the child were outside the duties of care and control, civil
liability for the child's injury will not be absolved by the doctrine of
parental immunity.
85
Since Foley, Illinois courts have continued to grant parents immunity
for negligence within the scope of the parental relationship.8 6 Most
cases granting parental immunity apply the "family purpose
exception,"8 7 which justifies parental immunity by promoting the public
policy of family harmony.8 8 Courts limit this exception by establishing
that parental immunity will not be granted for a parent's willful or
wanton acts. 89 While the Illinois courts have followed Foley's rationale
justifying parental immunity, the courts consistently carve out
exceptions to take into account the specific facts of each case. 90
Examples of the exceptions noted by the courts include the parent's
operation of a car and the maintenance of stairway banisters in the
home.9 1 The Illinois courts justify such exceptions by stating that, in
many cases involving either the natural parent or the non-parent, there is
a limited social utility in extending the grant of parental immunity.92
84. Id.
85. Id. at 582. The court reasoned that "there could be no recovery for injuries inflicted in the
exercise of such [parental] rights, but we are not prepared to say that if the contract was made, the
defendant could violate that contract and repudiate its obligations without civil responsibility to
any one." Id.
86. See, e.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525, 531 (Ill. 1956). The current public policies
that the court cites as a rationale to maintaining parent-child tort immunity include preserving
family harmony, discouraging fraudulent suits and preserving parental authority and discretion.
Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 723 (Ill. 1993). Throughout the evolution of the parental
immunity doctrine in Illinois, the original public policy justifications enumerated in Foley, and
restated in Cates with modernized language, have remained consistent.
87. Bennett v. Lahr, 612 N.E.2d 1381, 1383 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The Bennett court inferred
that the family purpose exception was explained as "the interest of the State in
maintaining ... the peace, harmony, tranquility, discipline, cooperation, love and respect essential
to good family relationship [considered] when the family immunity rule was promulgated many,
many years ago." Id. (citing Schenk v. Schenk, 241 N.E.2d 12, 13 (I11. App. Ct. 1968)).
88. Id.
89. Nudd, 131 N.E.2d at 531. The plaintiff was the administrator for the estate of the
defendant's children, who were killed while passengers in the defendant's car. Id. at 526. The
court stated that the conduct of the parent in this case was willful and wanton. Id. at 531. As
such, no Illinois policy requires that children be precluded from recovering from their parents
when the policy goals are not satisfied. Id.
90. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 723. The Cates court provided a detailed list of cases and
circumstances in which the court permitted a suit between parent and child despite the general
rule that children cannot sue their parents for negligence. Id. at 725-26.
91. Id.
92. Busillo v. Hetzel, 374 N.E.2d 1090, 1091 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). The court also explains that
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As the principle presently exists in Illinois, a parent who satisfies the
requirements of in loco parentis receives the protection of parental
immunity as long as the conduct in question is part of the parent-child
relationship, an exercise of parental authority, an act of supervision or
discretion over the child, and the parent maintains financial
responsibility for the child's care. 93  These parents' ability to claim
parental immunity, however, is both expressly and impliedly limited.94
For example, expressly excluded are those acts that are outside the
boundaries of socially acceptable treatment of children.
95
Illinois appellate courts have considered whether foster parents are
entitled to parental immunity. 96  One of the first cases to address the
issue was Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Peoples Bank.97  Here, the
court questioned whether, for the purposes of insurance law, a foster
child is considered a "resident" of the foster family's household.98
While the court held that the foster child was a "resident" of the foster
unless immunity is based on a grant of statutory in loco parentis status, then all the requirements
of the traditional in loco parentis standard should be satisfied before any immunity is granted. Id.
93. Id. The standard stated in Busillo v. Hetzel, which provides guidance for questions of
parental immunity involving foster parents, was applied in that case to deny grandparents parental
immunity. Id. The Busillo court made clear that in loco parentis status requires an assumption of
the obligations of a parent, including the financial burdens arising out of the relationship of a
parent and child. Id. Affection, generosity and exercise of care without the financial burdens of
parenthood are insufficient to place one in loco parentis to a child. Id. Further, grandparents
with temporary custody and control do not fall within the purview of the Illinois parental
immunity doctrine as the rationale behind the rule loses its persuasive force as situations
involving others than the actual parent are considered. Id.
94. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the
Cates court's conclusion that the limits to the principle of parental immunity are not enumerated
within any one decision of the court).
95. Cates, 619 N.E.2d at 729. The court stated "that parents in Illinois must conform their
treatment of their children within certain socially acceptable limits or face criminal and civil
actions by the state. Such actions are instituted regardless of the fact that parental authority is
thereby circumscribed . . . [t]here yet exist limits to parental immunity beyond those recognized
here." Id.
96. The grant of parental immunity and in loco parentis status to foster parents, irrespective of
the individual's designation as a state employee, remains undetermined. This is true even though
the grant of parental immunity and in loco parentis status rests upon the fundamental principles
and tests stated in the above section. Despite these principles, the court's willingness to permit
exceptions to standard tests for parental immunity leaves non-parental caretakers without
guidance regarding questions of parental immunity.
97. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peoples Bank, 675 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); see supra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing the events leading up to Louise Osbom's death
and explaining that there are two separate cases against the Augsburgers, who were acting as
Louise Osborn's foster parents, based on the same set of facts).
98. Country Mut., 675 N.E.2d at 1035. This case centered on the question of whether the
foster parents' homeowner's policy was required to insure a foster child temporarily living in the
home. Id. at 1032.
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parents' household for insurance purposes, it also stated that there is no
automatic assumption that the foster parents receive parental
immunity. 99  The court stated that foster parents, in providing
supervision to foster children, have a high exposure to lawsuits if foster
children are injured or killed while in their care.100 The court further
explained that if foster parents were uniformly protected by the doctrine
of parental immunity, the Country Mutual case would never have been
brought because the foster parents would clearly have been protected by
the doctrine.' 0 '
In a case based on the same facts as Country Mutual, the appellate
court in Commerce Bank v. Augsburger10 2 again questioned whether
foster parents would be liable for their foster child's death. The court
established that parental immunity is only appropriate in cases where its
application is necessary to preserve authority and discipline between the
parent and child. 10 3  The court held that the principles of parental
immunity also applied to the foster parent-child relationship.'0 4 The
court stated that such a relationship involves responsibilities including
supervision and discipline of the child, and that the discretion given to
natural parents should also be given to foster parents.' 0 5  The court
99. Id. at 1034. The court stated that "if foster parents have [parental] immunity, the Bank has
no case here." Id.
100. Id. at 1034. The court reasoned that,
[T]he exposure of foster parents to suits by foster children in regard to the supervision
and care given to the foster children would appear to be greater than the exposure to
suits brought by natural or adopted children, because in the latter case natural and
adoptive parents are still protected by parent-child immunity.
Id.
101. Id. This statement seems to imply that foster parents do not have parental immunity.
102. Commerce Bank v. Augsburger, 680 N.E.2d 822 (I11. App. Ct. 1997); see also supra
notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of both cases involving the Augsburgers
and the events that resulted in the foster child's death from discipline imposed by the foster
parents).
103. Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 723 (I11. 1993); see also Commerce Bank, 680 N.E.2d at
826; supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the Cates case). The
Commerce Bank court summarized Cates by stating:
[T]he Cates majority opinion considered other inroads upon the parental immunity
doctrine and concluded that the "preservation of family harmony" and the
discouragement of fraud and collusion considerations for the doctrine were not longer
viable, but the preservation of authority and discipline aspects of the doctrine made
sense and should be preserved.
Commerce Bank, 680 N.E.2d at 826. The historical background of parental immunity is
presented in a recent law review article. Pipino, supra note 76, at 1111-21.
104. Commerce Bank, 680 N.E.2d at 827; see also infra note 107 (discussing the Commerce
Bank court's rationale in granting foster parents parental immunity and its opinion that foster
parents require the same discretion granted to natural parents).
105. Commerce Bank, 680 N.E.2d at 827.
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made clear that parental immunity would apply only to foster parents
where there was no willful or wanton conduct.10 6 As a policy rationale,
the court stated that the frequent animosity between natural parents and
foster parents, which often leads to frivolous claims by natural parents,
was a sound basis upon which to grant foster parents immunity for torts
committed upon foster children.' 07
In Wallace v. Smyth, 108 the appellate court specifically questioned the
relationship between in loco parentis status and the grant of parental
immunity. In Wallace, DCFS placed twelve-year-old Waketta Wallace
at Maryville Academy for a ninety-day assessment, during which time
he died as a result of physical restraint by Maryville administrators. 10 9
Waketta's mother filed suit on behalf of the child's estate.'"° The court
began its analysis with an affirmation that in loco parentis status implies
that a non-parent is standing in the place of a parent and is assuming all
parental rights and obligations."' The court specifically mentioned that
the assumption of the usual financial burden of parenting is a required
106. Id. (stating that parental immunity would not apply to willful or wanton acts).
107. Id. As a policy justification for granting foster parents immunity, the court reasoned that:
Often animosity can exits between natural parents and foster parent. Exposure to suit
for negligence in supervising and disciplining the children in their custody would be a
deterrent to the best performance by the foster parent in this regard. We find no
precedent for denying parental immunity here and deem the granting of it consistent
with the theory of Cates.
Id. Noticeably absent from both Augsburger decisions is any discussion regarding whether the
foster parents stood in loco parentis and how this relates to the decision to grant parental
immunity upon the foster parents. See generally Commerce Bank v. Augsburger, 680 N.E.2d 822
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peoples Bank, 675 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997); supra notes 61-62 (noting that there are two separate cases involving the Augsburger
based on the same events).
108. Wallace v. Smyth, 703 N.E.2d 416 (I11. App. Ct. 1998).
109. Id. at 418. The court concluded their factual examination by stating that:
[The physical restraint] continued for approximately four hours in the middle of the
hallway floor while other children walked past .... In the course of his restraint,
Waketta warned the counselors he had to urinate and that he might urinate upon
himself. They continued to restrain him. Even after Waketta urinated upon himself,
the counselors continued to restrain him ... [alt approximately 6:00 p.m. [the restraint
ended and] ... [t]he counselors flipped Waketta onto his back and Voltz
unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate Waketta.
Id. Medical testimony stated that the cause of death was asphyxia. Id.
110. Id. at417.
111. Id. at 419. The court cited to a variety of different cases decided in Illinois, all of which
affirmed that in loco parentis is to be used sparingly and only in situations where the rights and
responsibilities of parenting are assumed. See, e.g., Lawber v. Doil, 547 N.E.2d 752 (11. 1989);
Bland v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 490 N.E.2d 1327 (I11. App. Ct. 1986); Busillo v.
Hetzel, 374 N.E.2d 1090 (I11. App. Ct. 1978); see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text
(discussing the respective holdings and reasoning of the Lawber decision and the Busillo
decision).
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element of in loco parentis status. 112 According to the court, the mere
act of housing, caring, and educating another's child does not alone
confer in loco parentis status. 113  The court held that because DCFS
maintained enough control over the child's daily activities, through the
Illinois Administrative Code, Maryville Academy did not satisfy the
requirements of in loco parentis.114 Without satisfaction of the in loco
parentis test, Waketta's caretakers could not qualify for immunity under
the doctrine of parental immunity.'1 15
Illinois courts have had numerous opportunities to question whether
foster parents are entitled to parental immunity. 116  The courts have
arrived at inconsistent holdings, leaving foster parents, state
administrators and courts throughout the state without clear guidance as
to whether foster parents are entitled to parental immunity. 17 It is
112. Wallace, 703 N.E.2d at 419 (citing Busillo, 374 N.E.2d at 1091).
113. Id. at 420. The court noted that to extend in loco parentis status to those who provided
only housing, care and education would create a situation where far too many parties would stand
in loco parentis. See id. The parties who would be granted in loco parentis include "summer
camps, day-care centers, medical and physiological treatment facilities, and grandparents." Id.
The court concluded by stating that, if this is the desired result, it should be accomplished by
"legislative enactment, not judicial fiat." Id.
114. Id. The court stated that "the relevant legislation here is Illinois' Administrative Code
which states DCFS has legal and financial responsibility for children of whom it is guardian,
regardless of their momentary location." Id. (citing ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 359.7-359.9
(2000)).
115. Id.
116. Wallace v. Smyth, 703 N.E.2d 416 (Il. App. Ct. 1998); Commerce Bank v. Augsburger,
680 N.E.2d 822 (II. App. Ct. 1997); Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peoples Bank, 675 N.E.2d 1031
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997); see also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing that there are
two separate cases involving the Augsburgers, both arising from the death of three-year-old
Louise Osborn).
117. Compare Wallace, 703 N.E.2d at 420, with Commerce Bank, 680 N.E.2d at 827-28, and
Country Mut,, 675 N.E.2d at 1034-35 (the court in Wallace held that the group institution where
the child was placed by DCFS was not standing in loco parentis, whereas the court in Commerce
Bank and Country Mutual held that the foster parents licensed by a private agency were entitled
to the leeway given to natural parents under the doctrine of parental immunity).
Other jurisdictions have also questioned whether foster parents qualify for parental immunity.
These jurisdictions have also arrived at ambiguous and inconsistent holdings on the issue. In
Mayberry v. Pryor, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a foster parent-child relationship could
never rise to the level of in loco parentis, the result being that foster parents are never entitled to
parental immunity. Mayberry v. Pryor, 374 N.W.2d 683, 689 (Mich. 1985). In this case, the
foster child, who was deaf, was placed with the defendant foster parents when he was
approximately two years old. Id. at 684. When the child was about four years old, he was
attacked by a dog while sitting alone on the defendant foster parents front porch. Id. The trial
court dismissed the complaint against the foster parents on the basis of parental immunity. Id.
The Supreme Court of Michigan reasoned that the foster parent-child relationship centered on a
contract and that the foster parent and their home had to conform to strict statutory guidelines. Id.
at 686. The court further stated that family preservation and protection of family resources was
the policy impetus for parental immunity and that the nature of the foster parent-child relationship
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within the context of this ambiguity, as well as the ambiguity
surrounding questions of foster parents rights to sovereign immunity,
that the Illinois Supreme Court undertook the opportunity to provide
clarification and consistency in Nichol v. Stass.
III. DISCUSSION
In Nichol v. Stass, the Illinois Supreme Court decided whether foster
parents licensed by a private agency are entitled to sovereign immunity
and parental immunity when the foster child in their care dies as a result
of their negligence. 118 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the foster
parents did not qualify as state employees entitled to immunity, but that
they may be entitled to a limited grant of parental immunity."19
fell outside these goals. Id. The court also noted that foster parents "are compensated for
expenses incurred in caring for the child." Id. The Mayberry court made clear that foster
children must be permitted a remedy for torts committed by their foster parents. Id. at 689. The
court stated the "the interests of the child outweigh those of the foster parents and that the
parental immunity doctrine should not be further extended." Id. The court concluded by stating
that if this extension of the doctrine was desired, it is in the legislature's power to do so. Id.; see
also Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So.2d 801, 805 (Ala. 1992) (agreeing with the policy reasons stated in
Mayberry but concluding that in cases of ordinary negligence, as compared to willful and wanton
negligence, foster parents were eligible to receive parental immunity); Newsome v. Dep't of
Human Servs., 405 S.E.2d 61, 63 (Ga. Ct. App., 1991) (holding that the facts of the case did not
permit a granting of in loco parentis status and accompanying parental immunity, but that if the
child had been in the care of the defendant foster parents at the time of the tort, parental immunity
would have been appropriate).
In In re Diana P., the New Hampshire court arrived a decision contrary to the holding in
Mayberry. Compare In re Diana P., 424 A.2d 178, 181 (N.H. 1980), with Mayberry, 374
N.W.2d 683. The New Hampshire Supreme Court analyzed the definition of in loco parentis to
determine the rights and standing of foster parents. Diana P., 424 A.2d at 180. In this case, the
foster child, Diana P., was neglected by her natural mother and placed into foster care at eleven
months old. Id. at 179. Diana's natural mother visited infrequently, and the foster parents
subsequently requested that the court terminate the natural parents' parental rights so that they
could adopt Diana. Id. at 180. The court held that the foster parents' fights depended upon
establishing an intentional acceptance of the duties of parenthood, financial support of the child
and the amount of time the child had been in the foster home. Id. The court further required the
formation of a "psychological family," which they determined occurred after a few weeks and
before two or three years. Id. at 181. Only when the foster parent proved all these elements, as
occurred in this case, would the court grant the foster parents fights. Id. The court reasoned that
"a status of in loco parentis has arisen out of the foster parents' relationship." Id.
118. Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 585 (I11. 2000).
119. Id. at 589.
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A. The Facts
Jonathan Nichol died on June 16, 1995.120 He was two years old
when he drowned in a toilet in the home of John and Bonnie Stass. 12
1
The Stasses were Jonathan's foster parents, and through an independent
child welfare agency that worked with DCFS, they were vested with the
responsibility of caring for Jonathan. 122
Following his death, Jonathan's natural parents filed an action in the
Circuit Court of Cook County alleging that the Stasses failed to
supervise Jonathan, failed to protect him from any potential hazards
within the home and failed to seek proper medical assistance for
Jonathan. 123 In response, the Stasses filed a motion to dismiss averring
that, as foster parents, they were entitled to sovereign immunity. 124 The
court held that because the foster parents were entitled to sovereign
immunity, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 125 The Nichols
immediately appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District of
Illinois. 12
6
120. Id. at 584. All recounting of the facts are taken from Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Nichol v. Stass, unless otherwise cited. It is worth noting the absence of any statement of the
non-procedural facts from the appellate decision of this case. See Nichol v. Stass, 697 N.E.2d
758 (I11. App. Ct. 1998), rev'd, 735 N.E.2d 582 (Ill. 2000).
121. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 584.
122. Id. It is unknown why Jonathan was placed in foster care. Cf. Child Protection, supra
note 5 (discussing DCFS's mission statement of ensuring safety for every child).
123. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 584. The plaintiffs sought recovery from each of the defendants
under the Wrongful Death Act, the Rights of Married Persons Act and the Survival Act, alleging
that "the defendants negligently violated various duties imposed by the common law and by
administrative regulations, and further, that liability was established under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur." Id. (citing The Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1 (1998); The Rights
of Married Persons Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/15 (1996); The Survival Act, 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/27-6 (1998)). Res ipsa loquitur, translated as "the thing speaks for itself," is an accepted
doctrine in tort law. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 237 (5th ed. 1999).
124. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 585. In support of their motion to dismiss, the Stasses cited to 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/8(d) (1998 & West Supp. 2000), which states that all actions against the
state and its agents must be heard in the court of claims, and 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-619 (a)(1)
and (a)(9) (1998), which states that a motion to dismiss may be granted if (1) the court does not
have subject matter jurisdiction and the defect of subject matter cannot be resolved through a
transfer of the case and ... (9) the claim is barred by another matter, the legal effect of which is
defeating to the claim at issue. Id.
125. Nichol v. Stass, 697 N.E.2d 758, 759 (I11. App. Ct. 1998), rev'd, 735 N.E.2d 582 (I11.
2000). The trial court reasoned that it had to reserve its judgment because the defendants'
attorney informed the court that the appellate court was deciding the Griffen v. Fluellen case, in
which there were similar issues. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 585. After Griffen was decided, the trial
judge concluded that he was required to follow Griffen and granted the Stasses' motion to
dismiss. Id.
126. Nichol, 735 NE.2d at 585. The appellate judge granted the Nichols' the right to
immediate appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), stating that if there are multiple
claims for relief, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment without delay only if the trial
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B. The Appellate Court Decision
The First District of the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed that the
Stasses were entitled to sovereign immunity. 127  The court concluded
that while foster parents act in a capacity to carry out the non-delegable
duty the state owes to foster children, they are entitled to sovereign
immunity.' 28  There was no discussion of whether the Stasses were
entitled to parental immunity, as this defense was not raised until the
case reached the Illinois Supreme Court. 129
To support these conclusions, the court applied the two-part test
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Healy v. Vaupel.130  The
appellate court used the Healy test to address the question of whether
the Nichols' suit was actually against the state and not the Stasses,
thereby granting the Stasses sovereign immunity. 131  First, the court
considered whether the foster parents are agents or employees of the
state. 132 The court stated unequivocally that foster parents act for the
government and are agents of the state. 133 The court also stated that an
independent contractor relationship is created when foster parents
receive their license from a private child welfare agency. Therefore,
liability continues to rest with the state because the care of foster
judge enters an express written order stating that there is no reason to delay. Nichol, 697 N.E.2d
at 759.
127. Nichol, 697 N.E.2d at 765. The appellate court reasoned that "foster parents also are
agents of the State because they are performing duties which are statutorily mandated as
government duties." Id. at 761.
128. Id. at 761-63. To establish the state's non-delegable duty, the appellate court reasoned
that "the State's duty to provide for the care of its foster children is non-delegable such that the
State was not relieved of duty to provide care for the foster child/ward in the instant case when
the defendant foster parents contracted with the State to assume that duty." Id. at 762.
129. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 585.
130. Nichol, 697 N.E.2d at 765 (citing Healy v. Vaupel, 549 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (I11. 1990)).
The Healy test states:
[T]hat when there are "(1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted
beyond the scope of his authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have
been breached was not owed to the public generally independent of the fact of State
employment; and (3) where the complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily
within that employee's normal and official functions of the State, then the cause of
action is only nominally against the employee." In those circumstances, the action is
one against the State and must, therefore, be brought in the Court of Claims.
Healy, 549 N.E.2d at 1247 (quoting Robb v. Sutton, 498 N.E.2d 267 (I11. Ct. App. 1986)).
131. Nichol, 697 N.E.2d at 760.
132. Id. at 760-61. The court stated that "the inclusion of foster parents in the definition of
employee in that Act [5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 350/1 (1998 & West Supp. 2000)] does not
conclusively establish employment status for sovereign immunity purposes." Id. at 760-61.
133. Id. at 761.
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children is a non-delegable duty. 134 The court concluded by stating that
it could find no reason not to grant foster parents sovereign
immunity. 135
Second, the court addressed the question of whether foster parents are
held to any duties independent of their position as foster parents. 136 The
court noted the differing appellate court decisions in Griffen and
Swanigan on the issue, but analyzed the case based solely on whether
the duty existed because of their status as foster parents. 137  The court
concluded that any duties between Jonathan Nichol and the Stasses
existed only because of the foster care relationship.' 38  Since the court
reasoned that the Stasses' independent duty was only a duty of
"reasonable care," and there was no allegation that the Stasses violated
this duty, the court concluded that there was no breach of an
independent duty of care. 139 Based on this two-part analysis, the
appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim. 140
C. The Illinois Supreme Court Opinion
In a five-to-two decision, 14 1 the majority opinion reversed the
appellate court's holding that the Stasses were state employees entitled
to sovereign immunity. 142 The majority also considered whether foster
134. Id. at 762. The court stated that while there is no one test to determine whether a duty is
non-delegable, it looked to the Second Restatement of Agency, section 214, and determined that
the state's statutory duty to "provide direct child welfare services for foster children who are its
wards" was sufficient to establish a non-delegable duty. Id. at 762.
135. Id. at 763.
136. Id. at 763-64.
137. Id. at 764. The appellate court stated that "the analysis must look to the source of the
duty breached and whether that duty existed solely because of the plaintiffs status." Id. at 765;
see also supra notes 46, 54 and accompanying text (discussing the respective reasoning of the
court in the Swanigan and Griffen decisions and the effect of each court's holding).
138. Nichol, 697 N.E.2d at 765. The court reasoned that the "breach... is dependent on that
relationship because without that relationship the foster parent would have no duty to exercise
ordinary care in the supervision and monitoring of the foster child." Id.
139. Id. The court stated that "there is no allegation that the foster parents were negligent in
failing to exercise reasonable care with respect to a condition on the premises." Id.
140. Id. at 765-66. Near the end of the opinion, the court did state that if the plaintiffs had
alleged that the Stasses' failed to exercise reasonable care, this would have defeated any possible
claim of sovereign immunity. Id. at 765.
141. Justice Miller wrote for the majority of the court, including Chief Justice Harrison and
Justices Bilandic, McMorrow, and Rathje. Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 584 (I11. 2000).
Justices Heiple and Freeman filed separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 592 (Heiple, J., dissenting),
594 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 591. Upon presentation to the Illinois Supreme Court, the plaintiffs' presented two
issues for review. The first issue was whether the lower courts had correctly decided that the
foster parents were either state employees or agents and could therefore assert the protection of
the sovereign immunity doctrine. Id. at 586. The court considered a variety of statutes and
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parents could receive the protection of parental immunity, an issue not
addressed in either the trial or appellate courts. 143  The majority held
that foster parents may be entitled to a limited grant of parental
immunity for any injuries to the foster children in their care, but
required more specific facts and, therefore, remanded the issue.1 44 The
court stated that foster parents, like natural parents, are in a position of
parental authority and should receive the same immunity granted to
natural parents. 14
5
1. Sovereign Immunity is Inappropriate for Foster Parents
The majority held that the foster parents were not state employees. 146
The court expressly rejected the argument that the existence of
regulations for foster parents contained in the Illinois Administrative
Code transformed foster parents into state employees. 147  The court
determined that neither the Illinois Administrative Code nor the Illinois
reasoned that:
The record in the present case is not entirely clear concerning the relationship among
the Stasses, [Human Enrichment and Development Association], and the Department
of Children and Family Services ... it was the defendants' motion to dismiss, and
therefore it was their duty to supply a record in support of their motion. In the absence
of these documents, and in light of the relevant statutes ... we must conclude that the
Stasses were independent contractors rather than employees or agents of the state.
Id. at 586-87.
The second issue, raised by the defendants, was whether parental immunity was applicable if
the court determined sovereign immunity to be inappropriate. Id. at 589. Justice Miller wrote
the majority opinion. Id. at 584. Justice Heiple did not agree with the majority decision on the
question of parental immunity and wrote a separate dissenting opinion on this issue. Id. at 592
(Heiple, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman dissented from the majority decision on both issues and
wrote his own dissenting opinion. Id. at 594 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 589.
144. Id. at 591.
145. Id. at 589-90. The court considered the reasoning it had employed in Cates. Id. at 589.
It held that the rationale of preserving parental immunity was equally applicable to foster parents.
Id.; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (reasoning that certain policy goals still existed
sufficient to justify the maintenance of parental immunity).
146. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 587. The court reasoned that the foster parents had "failed to
establish they are state employees or agent." Id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing the
ramifications of the court deciding that it is possible for foster parents to present facts that could
entitle them to sovereign immunity).
147. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 587. The court considered various sections of title 89 of the
Illinois Administrative Code as well as sections of the Illinois Compiled Statutes that consider
sovereign immunity in general and specifically foster parents. Id. The court stated that they did
"not believe that the preceding measures are anything more than licensing requirements or that
they serve to establish the defendants' role as state employees or agents." Id. See generally 5
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 350/1 (1998 & West Supp. 2000); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402
(2000); supra Part II.A (discussing the Illinois Administrative Code and its role in regulating the
foster parents and the entire foster care system).
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Compiled Statutes provisions addressing foster parents automatically
transformed foster parents into state employees. 148  Further, the court
considered that foster parents are entitled to indemnification and
representation, but concluded that this benefit does not transform foster
parents into state employees. 149 The court determined that because the
defendants failed to present any conclusive evidence on the questions of
sovereign immunity, there was no basis for a grant of sovereign
immunity to the foster parents. 150
The majority also disagreed with the appellate court's analysis of
whether the duty owed to foster children was the state's non-delegable
duty.' 5 1  While the court made clear that it was not questioning any
decision of the United States Supreme Court, it distinguished the case at
bar from prior Supreme Court decisions.'52 The court rejected the
appellate court's application of principles from the common law of
Torts and Agency as imposing upon the state a non-delegable duty of
care for foster children. 153  In addition, the court unequivocally stated
148. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 587. The court reasoned that "[tihe existence of those
administrative requirements, however, does not mean that the persons subject to them are state
employees or agents." Id.; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the sections of the Illinois
Administrative Code and Illinois Compiled Statutes that discuss foster parents).
149. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 587. The court stated that "the preceding definition [including
foster parents as employees] simply affirms the entitlement of foster parents to indemnification,
without also establishing, for other purposes, their status as government employees or agents."
Id.
150. Id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing the significant implications of the court's failure to
make clear whether foster parents are unilaterally not entitled to sovereign immunity).
151. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 588. The Illinois Supreme Court summarized the reasoning of the
appellate court as also believing that sovereign immunity could be invoked in the present case
because, whether or not the defendants are deemed state agents or employees, the state owed
Jonathan, a ward of the court, a continuing, non-delegable duty of care. The appellate court
further believed that the state would be vicariously liable for conduct of the foster parents in
violations of that duty. Id. at 587.
152. Id. at 588. The distinction drawn by the court was between the degree of misconduct and
the resulting public liability. Id. at 588. According to the Nichol court, this was a distinction
from Youngberg v. Romeo, in which the United States Supreme Court stated that the state owes
certain duties to the children in places in state care. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Youngberg involved a question of foster children's rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.; see also
42 U.S.C § 1983 (West 1998) (which establishes a civil cause of action for a deprivation of rights
under an equal protection theory). The Nichol court stated that this case involved the question of
foster parents' negligent conduct. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 588. The court reasoned that for the
rationale of Youngberg to apply, the plaintiffs would have to make an allegation against the state
for placing Jonathan in the foster parents home, and no such allegation existed. Id.
153. Id. at 589. The court distinguished this case from what was envisioned by the Second
Restatement of Torts section 424 because in this case it is the principal (the state) imposing the
regulations. The court held that section 424 envisioned a situation where it was the principal who
was held to a statutory standard. The court further stated that the Second Restatement of Agency
sections 214 and 251 do not apply because they require that the principal be required to "impose
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that the state's act of providing placement, exercising general authority,
and establishing required procedures does not create a non-delegable
duty. 154  The court made clear that any relationship between the foster
child and the state is separate from the relationship between the foster
child and the foster parent. 155  Based on the application of the Illinois
Administrative Code and the Illinois Compiled Statutes, as well as a
reversal of the appellate court's decision to impute a non-delegable duty
on the state, the court held that there is no basis upon which to provide
foster parents with sovereign immunity. 156
2. Parental Immunity is Appropriate for Foster Parents
While not considered by either the trial court or the appellate court,
the majority held that foster parents may be entitled to a limited grant of
parental immunity for torts committed upon the foster children in their
care. 157 To begin its analysis, the majority stated that parental immunity
is only appropriate when the injury occurred during conduct inherent to
the parent-child relationship. 158  Further, the majority stated that
parental immunity is necessary to preserve parental authority and
discipline. 159 After a cursory examination of decisions in jurisdictions
where foster parents were given parental immunity, the majority held
that the rationale for parental immunity, the necessity to preserve
parental authority, is equally applicable to foster parents.' 60
an independent duty to guarantee compliance ... with those provisions." Id. at 588-89; see also
supra Part II.A and notes 35-37, 39 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement sections
and their adoption in Illinois law).
154. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 589.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 587-89.
157. Id. at 590. The court addressed the question of parental immunity despite the fact that
the defendants' did not raise the defense of parental immunity at trial because it qualified as an
"affirmative matter." Id. at 591 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/ 2 -619(a)(1) (West 2000)) (stating
that a defense of immunity is an "affirmative matter" that can be raised in a motion to dismiss and
is not waived by a failure to state the defense at trial). The court held that the question of parental
immunity had to be remanded to the lower court to determine facts that were not considered in
prior proceedings. id.
158. Id. at 589 (citing generally Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715 (1993)); see also supra Part
II.A (discussing whether courts in Illinois and throughout the country have granted foster parents
parental immunity); supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the Cates decision and the
court's reasoning in upholding the doctrine of parental immunity).
159. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 589. Before stating that foster parents in Illinois were entitled to a
limited form of parental immunity, the majority noted that there is no consensus among other
jurisdictions on the issue of whether foster parents should receive parental immunity. Id.
160. Id. at 590. The majority distinguished foster parents from the natural parent considered
in Cates because of the reimbursement provided to foster parents. Id. Despite this distinction,
the majority stated that "they exercise a substantial amount of discretion in discipline,
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The majority provided additional support for the proposition that
foster parents are entitled to parental immunity by analogizing foster
parents to teachers. 161 The majority stated that teachers are granted in
loco parentis status and immunity for the injuries of their students
because failure to grant this status would jeopardize the productivity of
the teacher-student relationship. 162  From this statement, the majority
reasoned that the foster parent-child relationship is similar to that of a
teacher and student in both purpose and duration. 163  Because of these
similarities, the majority concluded that foster parents stand in loco
parentis and, therefore, granting them parental immunity is consistent
with prior decisions granting immunity to other individuals who stand
in loco parentis.164 The majority tempered its decision by requiring a
case-by-case analysis of each situation in which foster parents make a
claim of parental immunity for a tort committed upon the foster child in
their care. 165 The court, however, failed to issue a specific holding
regarding parental immunity in this case because the issue was not
considered at either the trial court or appellate court level, and,
consequently, there were not enough facts presented to determine
whether the foster parents deserved parental immunity. 166
D. Justice Heiple's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Heiple agreed with the majority that foster
parents are not entitled to sovereign immunity for the torts committed
upon their foster children. 167  Despite his partial agreement with the
majority holding, Justice Heiple argued that the majority incorrectly
supervision, and care, areas in which Cates found immunity to be appropriate." Id. at 589-90.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. In its analogy, the court reasoned that, "[1]ike teachers, foster parents receive
compensation for their work. Moreover, the relationship between a foster parent and a foster
child, like the relationship between a teacher and a student, is not permanent and may even be
relatively brief." Id.; see also infra note 243 and accompanying text (discussing a statute known
as the "school code" that confers in loco parentis status on teachers and the reasoning of courts
that have addressed this matter).
164. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 590.
165. Id. The court held that "the scope of parental immunity in this context must be tempered
by the circumstances peculiar to the foster-child relationship." Id.
166. Id. at 591. The case had to be remanded on this point because there was a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the issue of parental immunity for the Stasses. Id.
167. Id. at 592 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Justice Heiple stated that the majority correctly
determined that the foster parents in this case could not use sovereign immunity as a defense to
the Nichols' claim because they were neither employees nor agents of the state. Id. (Heiple, J.,
dissenting). It is unclear from this statement whether his agreement with the majority is that
foster parents are never entitled to sovereign immunity or that the facts of this case prevent these
foster parents from being granted sovereign immunity. See id. (Heiple J., dissenting).
[Vol. 32
Nichol v. Stass
decided the issue of parental immunity. Justice Heiple supported this
argument by citing the "fundamental differences" in the relationship of
a natural parent and child and a foster parent and child. 168 Further,
Justice Heiple examined the accepted definition and requirements of in
loco parentis status and concluded that both the responsibilities
accorded to foster parents and the relationship between foster parents
and children was not sufficient to satisfy the definitional standards of in
loco parentis status. 16
9
Justice Heiple cited six distinct differences between the natural
parent-child relationship and the foster parent-child relationship to
support his conclusion that foster parents are not entitled to parental
immunity. 170  First, Justice Heiple pointed to the fact that many foster
parents are in no way related to their foster children.' 71 Next, Justice
Heiple stated that the contractual nature of the foster parent-child
relationship, particularly the fact that foster parents are entitled to
reimbursement for the costs associated with acting as foster parents,
should prevent foster parents from receiving parental immunity.
172
Moreover, Justice Heiple reasoned that foster parents are not entitled to
parental immunity because the stated purpose of the foster care program
is to provide children with a temporary home only until the child can be
reunited with his or her natural parent. 173  Finally, Justice Heiple
pointed out that the Illinois Compiled Statutes define foster parents as
"professional member[s] of the child welfare team." 174 Foster parents
voluntarily accept these terms, and as such, Justice Heiple argued that
they should not receive immunity when they fail to use reasonable care
in performing the duties they chose to undertake.
175
168. See id. (Heiple J., dissenting). According to Justice Heiple:
A foster parent is not related to a foster child by blood or adoption. The relationship
between a foster parent and a foster child is created exclusively by contract. Foster
parents, unlike biological or adoptive parents, receive reimbursement for expenses
related to the care of the foster child. Moreover a foster parent's relationship with a
foster child is purposely designed to be temporary. When a child is placed in foster
care, the state's paramount goal remains to reunite the child with his biological parents.
Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
169. See id. at 604 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 592 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting) (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 520/1-15(1) (1998)); see
also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the statute and its impact on foster parents
rights and responsibilities).
175. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 592 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
2001]
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In response to the majority's statement that granting foster parents
parental immunity falls under the same rationale as granting immunity
to natural parents, Justice Heiple argued that the relationship between
the foster parent and child was so "strictly circumscribed" by the Illinois
Administrative Code that the maintenance of family harmony rationale
could not apply. 176 Justice Heiple reasoned that the parental discretion
the court intended to protect by granting parental immunity rarely
comes into existence for foster parents; as a result, there is no basis
upon which to grant parental immunity. 177  In considering the policy
ramifications of granting foster parents parental immunity, Justice
Heiple took specific issue with the majority's assertion that failure to
grant parental immunity would deter foster parents from their best
performance. 178 Justice Heiple stated that while the majority's concern
was for the rights of foster parents, it failed to consider the rights of
children placed in foster care. 179  In conclusion, Justice Heiple stated
that the majority's failure to decide the issue leaves both the parties in
this case and future parties without the necessary guidance on the status
of the law. 180
E. Justice Freeman's Dissent
Justice Freeman began his dissent with a clear statement that he
viewed foster parents as state agents. 18 1 In support of this contention,
Justice Freeman explained that foster parents are members of the "child
welfare team" and perform duties for DCFS, an agency created by the
176. Id. at 593 (Heiple, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Heiple considered title 89, section
402.21 of the Illinois Administrative Code, which provides regulations as to how and to what
extent a foster parent can punish a foster child. Id. at 592-93 (Heiple J., dissenting); see also
supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing section 402.21 of the Illinois Administrative
Code and the limitations it places on foster parent discretion).
177. Nichol, 735 N.E. at 592-93 (Heiple, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 593 (Heiple, J., dissenting). According to Justice Heiple:
Immunizing foster parents from liability eliminates a powerful incentive for ensuring
that foster parents adequately perform the duties for which they were hired. The
majority's rationale, whatever it means, has little relevance to this case. The Stasses
have no more duties to perform as foster parents; they no longer care for Jonathan
Nichol. He is dead.
Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Heiple, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 593-94 (Heiple, J., dissenting); see also infra Parts IV.A, V.A, V.B (discussing the
majority's failure to provide guidance for future courts considering similar issues and the impact
of the decision).
181. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 596 (Freeman, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Freeman states that the proper decision of the issues presented was not dependent on the specific
facts, but the established statutory and regulatory framework. Id. at 595-96 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
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state legislature to perform state duties. 182  Justice Freeman looked to
the licensing procedures, training programs, and record keeping
requirements of the foster care system, all of which are administered by
DCFS, for further support of his position that foster parents are state
agents. 18
3
In addition to the "integral role" foster parents take in the child
welfare team, Justice Freeman cited the foster parents' entitlement to
reimbursement and the state's control of virtually all aspects of the
foster care relationship as indicative of the fact that foster parents are
agents of the state. 184  According to Justice Freeman, the DCFS's
continued control of foster parents, the existence of the Illinois
Administrative Code, and the statutory language indicating that foster
parents "champion the efforts" of the entire child welfare team made
clear that foster parents are undoubtedly state agents. 185  Justice
Freeman concluded that, because the state retains control over so many
aspects of the foster parent-child relationship, "foster parents must be
considered agents of the state."' 186
Consistent with his finding that foster parents are state agents, Justice
Freeman stated that the state maintains a non-delegable duty to protect
182. Id. at 596 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-5 (1998)). Justice
Freeman dismissed any possible distinction between foster parents licensed by the state and those
licensed by a private agency. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). He stated that "[aIll foster parents,
whether supervised directly by DCFS or supervised by a child welfare agency, are subject to
DCFS licensing requirements, must participate in DCFS training programs.., and must comply
with DCFS standards relating to the appearance, cleanliness and safety of the facility ..... Id. at
596 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 597 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 596, 597 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 520/1-5, 1-15(4)
as support for his reasoning that foster parents are state agents because these statutes state that
foster parents fulfill an integral role on the child welfare team and are entitled to reimbursement);
see also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing title 20, section 520/1-15 and its
impact on the question of whether foster parents are entitled to sovereign immunity).
185. Id. at 596, 604 (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman provided an exhaustive list of
administrative code sections to emphasize the pervasive involvement of the state in the foster
parent-child relationship. Id. at 588-89 (Freeman, J., dissenting). Some of these sections define
what is permissive discipline, the appropriateness of overnight stays at a friend's home,
descriptions of how meals are served and general provisions of how foster parents must provide
supervision for the children in their care. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting); see also ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 89, § 402 et seq. (2000); supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text (discussing specific
provisions of the Illinois Administrative Code and their application in determining the agency
status of foster parents).
186. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 599-600 (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman summarized
his position by stating that "[i]n light of the fact that foster parents perform services for the state,
receive reimbursement from the state, and are subject to the state's control in all aspects of the
provision of care to children at the facility, foster parents must be considered agents of the state."
Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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foster children once they are placed in a foster home. 187  Using the
rationale established by the Second Restatement of Torts, Justice
Freeman proffered that the duty to care for foster children arises from
the Illinois Compiled Statutes.188 When a child dies or is injured by a
foster parent, it is because the state placed the child in the home in an
attempt to fulfill its statutorily created duty. 189 To lend support to this
proposition, Justice Freeman cited to Lipscomb v. Simmons, a Ninth
Circuit case in which the court stated that when the state takes a child
into its care, it takes on "very significant responsibilities."' 190 Because
foster parents are state agents charged by the state with a non-delegable
duty of care, Justice Freeman concluded that the state must be held
liable for permitting a person without the proper "temperament or
qualities" to take in and then injure a child placed under the state's
protection. '91
Justice Freeman also dissented from the majority's decision on the
question of parental immunity and, particularly, the majority's use of
the concept of in loco parentis.192 Justice Freeman began his analysis
by restating the definition of in loco parentis adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Busillo v. Hetzel. 193 Central to the portion quoted by
Justice Freeman is the requirement that a person who stands in loco
parentis assume the financial burden associated with the parent-child
relationship. 194 Justice Freeman further stated that at no point had the
Illinois court abrogated its prior decisions holding that "mere affection,
generosity, and exercise of care" were insufficient bases for the grant of
in loco parentis status and the immunity attached. 1
95
187. Id. at 600 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/5(a)(3), (g), (1-1) (1998)).
189. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman also reasoned that "[iun the case at bar, the
state had a duty to provide care to Jonathan Nichol. The state attempted to fulfill this duty by
placing Jonathan in the home of the Stasses, where he died." Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 601 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1385-
86 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
191. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 602 (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman stated in his dissent that the
majority's act of providing in loco parentis status to foster parents redefined the term with
possible unintended consequences. Id. at 604 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
193. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting) ("[tin loco parentis is one who 'take[s] upon himself the
obligations of a parent."' (quoting Busillo v. Hetzel, 374 N.E.2d 1090, 1091 (I11. App. Ct. 1978)
(alteration in original))); see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the accepted principles and
definition of in loco parentis from both case law and legal dictionaries).
194. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 602-03 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing Busillo, 374 N.E.2d at
1091).
195. Id. at 602 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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In applying what Justice Freeman saw as the accepted definition of in
loco parentis to the question before the court, he stated that prior courts
correctly found the DCFS as a party standing in loco parentis. 196
Consequently, the foster parents were not in loco parentis because they
never assumed all the burdens associated with parenthood. 197  To
answer the majority's analogy between teachers and foster parents as
equally entitled to in loco parentis status, Justice Freeman highlighted
that granting teachers in loco parentis status originates from specific
statutory language, not from the accepted definition of in loco
parentis.198 According to Justice Freeman, the majority's failure to note
this difference effectively eliminated the requirement of assuming
financial burden from the definition of in loco parentis status and over-
extended its application removing any meaning from the concept.
199
Further, Justice Freeman questioned why an area that was the subject of
so many statutes and administrative codes had failed to expressly
include the grant of in loco parentis status upon foster parents if the
legislature, in fact, intended foster parents to stand in loco parentis.
200
IV. ANALYSIS
The majority correctly determined that foster parents licensed by
private agencies are not agents of the state entitled to sovereign
immunity in suits arising from torts committed upon children in their
care. 20 ' The majority also correctly reasoned that although the Illinois
Administrative Code subjects foster parents to numerous state imposed
regulations, these regulations are exclusively for the purposes of
providing indemnification and establishing licensing standards.
20 2
However, the majority erroneously granted foster parents limited
parental immunity through an application of in loco parentis status and
196. Id. at 603 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman's reasoning was based on the long-
standing principle that without the assumption of a financial burden, in loco parentis status could
not be conferred. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing Lawber v. Doil, 547 N.E.2d 752, 753
(1989)).
198. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting). Justice Freeman stated that "it is by legislative enactment
that a teacher stands in loco parentis to a student. The legislature has not seen fit to include a
similar provision in the statutes relating to foster parents." Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 604 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Freeman, J., dissenting).
201. Supra Part III.C (discussing the majority's holding and reasoning for denying that the
detailed administrative codes created by the state to regulate foster parents confers sovereign
immunity upon the foster parents).
202. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 587; see also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the State Employee
Indemnification Act and the Illinois Administrative Code).
20011
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failed to consider the traditional standards required before granting
foster parents in loco parentis status and parental immunity. 20 3  Both
dissenting opinions correctly analyzed the question of parental
immunity by examining the accepted definitions of in loco parentis and
determining that foster parents could not fulfill the requirements.
20 4
Absent from both the majority and dissenting opinions was any
consideration of the foster parents' independent duty to the foster
child.20 5 The failure of both the majority and the dissent to consider this
issue implies that this decision was "result driven" and leaves foster
parents, as well as other courts, without any clear guidance.
206
A. The Comprehensive Statutory Regulation of Foster Parents: The
Invisible Bright Line Rule
The majority correctly held that no provision of Illinois law conferred
sovereign immunity upon foster parents licensed by a private agency.
20 7
Other jurisdictions that have determined whether foster parents are
entitled to sovereign immunity have deemed full sovereign immunity
appropriate only where the court can reasonably infer that the state
legislature intended to grant immunity to foster parents acting within the
scope of their employment. 20 8 The Nichol court cited the plain language
used in each legislatively enacted provision involving foster parents
which is extremely specific and leaves little space for interpretation or
debate.209  As neither the Illinois Compiled Statutes nor the Illinois
203. Supra Parts III.C-E (discussing the opposing opinions of the majority and the dissenting
justices on the application of the concept of parental immunity and in loco parentis status).
204. Supra Parts HI.D-E (discussing the reasoning and application of the dissenting Justices).
205. Supra Parts III (discussing the majority reasoning for granting parental immunity and the
dissenting justices opinions for denying parental immunity), II.B (discussing the established
standards of parental immunity and in loco parentis through an examination of both Illinois case
law and case law from outside Illinois).
206. Elizabeth M. Smith, Note, Hunte v. Blumenthal: A Case of Mistaken Identity, 30 CONN.
L. REV. 347, 364 (1997) (discussing how the Connecticut Supreme Court's detailed analysis of
the facts and the Court's reasoning must have been a "result-driven decision" to arrive at the
conclusion that the foster parents in Hunte were entitled to sovereign immunity).
207. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 586; supra Part III.C (discussing the majority's reasoning for
denying foster parents the protections of sovereign immunity).
208. See e.g., Hunte v. Blumenthal, 680 A.2d 1231, 1237 n.14 (Conn. 1986)). The Hunte
court examined statutory construction to determine whether the legislature intended to provide
foster parents with sovereign immunity and the level of regulation exerted over foster parents to
arrive at the conclusion that state licensed foster parents were entitled to immunity in the
wrongful death actions filed against them. Id. at 1233-34.
209. Supra Part II.A.I (discussing the legislative provisions related to foster care and their
impact on a determination of sovereign immunity for foster parents); supra notes 34-43 and
accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the statutes that regulate foster parents' behavior);
see also Smith, supra note 206, at 372 (reasoning that the existence of regulations are not a
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Administrative Code expressly or impliedly infer that foster parents
licensed by private agencies are entitled to complete sovereign
immunity, the Nichol court correctly determined that sovereign
immunity was inappropriate for foster parents.
210
While the court correctly stated that none of the legislatively
generated regulations granted foster parents sovereign immunity, the
majority's decision was not without ambiguity.211 The majority stated
that the defendant foster parents could have presented documents that
would have helped establish sovereign immunity. 212  Both the Illinois
Compiled Statutes and the Illinois Administrative Code, however, define
and articulate nearly every detail of the foster parents'
responsibilities.213 Therefore, the majority's failure to arrive at a clear
resolution as to whether foster parents licensed by private agencies are
entitled to sovereign immunity is contrary to precedent or legislative
support.
214
Absent from both the Illinois Compiled Statutes and the Illinois
Administrative Code is the inclusion of any specific language granting
foster parents complete sovereign immunity. 215  The legislature
expressly granted foster parents the right to representation and
indemnification, but remained noticeably silent on the specific question
of sovereign immunity. 216  This silence supports the majority's
sufficient basis upon which to decide that foster parents are entitled to sovereign immunity
because the result would be an irrational construction).
210. Smith, supra note 206, at 372 (arguing the existence of many regulations cannot make
foster parents state employees subject to sovereign immunity because the result would be an
irrational construction of state promulgated regulations).
211. Supra Part III.C (discussing the majority's failure to grant sovereign immunity while
leaving open the possibility that foster parents could present evidence that would convince the
court that sovereign immunity is appropriate).
212. See Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 586-87 (suggesting that documents reflecting the contracts
between the Department of Child and Family Services and Human Enrichment and Development
Association ("HEDA") and between HEDA and the foster parents might have helped).
213. Supra Parts II.A.2 (discussing the State Employee Indemnification Act and the Illinois
Administrative Code), III.E (explaining that Justice Freeman's dissent provided a detailed
inspection of numerous regulations imposed upon foster parents); see also Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at
598-99 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
214. See supra Part II.A (discussing the legislation of many aspects of the relationship
between the foster parents and the children in their care). But see Smith, supra note 206, at 367
(discussing that in Hunte, a case with facts similar to that of Nichol, the Connecticut Supreme
Court considered the language and legislative history of the statutes to conclude that sovereign
immunity was appropriate for the state licensed foster parents).
215. See generally, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 350/1(b) (1998 & West Supp. 2000); ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 89, § 402 (2000).
216. Compare P.A. 91-799 (codified at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/4.04(e) (2000 I11. Leg.
Serv.)) (expressing clearly that an "ombudsman" in the mental health care system receives full
immunity from all suits), with 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 350/1(b) (1998 and West Supp. 2000), and
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conclusion that foster parents should not receive full immunity for torts
committed upon their foster children. 21 7 The implication is the creation
of a clear rule: all elements central to the foster care relationship are
pre-determined by the legislature. The majority's failure to utilize this
silence while permitting foster parents to present evidence justifying the
application of sovereign immunity prevents the creation of any
workable bright line rule upon which future courts can base their
decisions.
218
While the majority arrived at the correct decision, its rationale
implies that privately licensed foster parents can present evidence
entitling them to sovereign immunity. 219  Implicit in this reasoning is
the conclusion that statutes governing foster care do not contain every
fundamental duty or obligation.220  One such fundamental duty not
stated in any relevant code arises from the established principle in tort
law that children are owed a higher duty because of their inability to
comprehend danger. 221 The majority's conclusion hinges upon the
specific evidence presented, rather than existing statutory law, and, as
such, it permits other courts to question whether foster parents owe their
foster children an independent common law duty.222  The result is the
failure to structure a workable rule for future Illinois courts.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402 (2000). These child welfare and foster parent codes are void of
any similar express language granting full immunity.
217. Supra Parts II.A.2 (discussing the State Employee Indemnification Act and the Illinois
Administrative Code which provides guidelines for foster care), III.C (discussing the majority's
reasoning that the relationship between the state and the foster parent remained too distant,
despite the existence of the detailed code, to imply an employment situation).
218. Mushlin, supra note 7, at 215-16. The author discusses the problems that plague the
foster care system, emphasizing that there is not enough legislative action to reform the system to
protect foster children from being victims of abuse in foster homes. Within this climate, the
author calls for judicial intervention to protect foster children because "[t]he judicial obligation to
enforce the rights of the politically powerless is at the heart of the American political system." Id.
at 216 (quoting Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for
Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R-C.L.L REv. 367, 386 (1977)).
219. See Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 591 (Il. 2000); supra note 166 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's reasoning that the defendant foster parents in this case did not
present sufficient evidence to convince the court that the court should grant them sovereign
immunity).
220. Supra Part III.C (discussing the majority's reasoning that the existing codes do not
provide for foster parent sovereign immunity but that certain evidence could prove otherwise and
create a situation where sovereign immunity would be appropriate).
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 339, 343B (1965); supra Part Il.A (discussing the
general bases and background of sovereign immunity); supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text
(explaining how the Swanigan court applied this principle to impose a separate duty upon a
DCFS licensed foster parent separate from her position as a foster parent).
222. Supra note 46 (explaining the reasoning of the Swanigan decision which stated that the
foster parent owed the injured foster child a duty of care independent from her responsibilities as
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B. Breaking the Parental Immunity Precedent: Erasing the Bright Line
Rule
The majority erroneously held that foster parents may be entitled to a
limited grant of parental immunity for torts committed upon children in
their care. 223 Both Justice Heiple and Justice Freeman correctly pointed
out that the majority disregarded accepted principles and policies
inherent in granting parental immunity and, instead, applied the doctrine
in a destructive manner. 224 The majority's decision to remand the issue
to the trial court leaves future courts facing similar issues without the
necessary guidance to apply the new rules formulated by the
majority.225
1. The Majority Disregarded the Policies Behind Parental Immunity
The majority incorrectly interpreted the policy proffered by cases
across the nation to apply the doctrine of parental immunity to foster
parents. 226  Further, the majority failed to fully consider how these
principles apply to foster parents and disregarded the distinction
between natural parents and foster parents. 227 The majority pointed to
Goller v. White, a Wisconsin decision in which the court granted a
foster parent limited parental immunity for a tort committed upon the
foster child in his care.228 In citing Goller, the majority failed to note
a foster parent).
223. Supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the majority's rationale for granting foster parents limited
parental immunity and in loco parentis status).
224. Supra Parts III.D-E (discussing Justice Heiple's reasoning that there are "fundamental
differences" between the natural parent-child relationship and the foster parent-child relationship
and Justice Freeman's reasoning that the existence of the Illinois Administrative Code should
preclude foster parents from receiving parental immunity for torts committed upon the children in
their care).
225. See Mushlin, supra note 7, at 216-17 (discussing how legislatures across the nation have
not been quick to reform the foster care system to protect foster children from foster parent abuse,
thereby requiring judicial intervention).
226. Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 589-90 (Ill. 2000); supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the
history and policy rationale of parental immunity); see also A. John Hoomani & Kimberly
Sieredzki Woodell, Note, Liner v. Brown: Where Should We Go From Here-Two Different
Approaches for North Carolina, 19 CAMPBELL L. REv. 447, 462 (1997). Hoomani and Woodell
quoted the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which concluded that "[blecause extension of the
parental immunity doctrine to one having temporary custody and control of a child would not
further the policies underlying the doctrine, foster parents standing in loco parentis are precluded
from enforcing the parent-child immunity doctrine." Hoomani & Woodell, supra, at 450 (quoting
Liner v. Brown, 449 S.E.2d 905, 909 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)).
227. Supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text (discussing the six reasons employed by
Justice Heiple to draw the distinction between natural and foster parents).
228. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 589 (citing Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963)); see
also supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the Goller court's reasoning that a foster
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that the Wisconsin court based its decision solely on a policy seeking to
uphold parental authority when the act was one of ordinary parental
discretion. 229  While the facts in Nichol may be similar to those in
Goller, the Illinois statutes and codes imposed on all foster parents
remove parental discretion, a substantial distinction from Wisconsin
law. Therefore, the Goller decision cannot reasonably be applied to
foster parents in Illinois.230
The majority also failed to consider how the fundamental doctrine
behind parental immunity applies to foster parents. 231  The majority
decision ignores that a founding principle of parental immunity was the
desire to maintain the authority necessary for healthy family
relationships.232 This principle cannot be applied to foster parents,
because their role is statutorily mandated as temporary and exists only
until the child can be returned to his natural parents. 233 In sum, parental
immunity is intended to grant parents immunity for those discretionary
acts inherent in the task of parenting.234 As foster parents are not vested
with the discretion that parental immunity intends to protect, there is no
rational basis upon which to extend parental immunity.235
father was not entitled to parental immunity because the injury did not occur during an exercise of
parental discretion).
229. Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
230. Supra notes 34-35 (discussing the relevant sections of the Illinois Compiled Statutes that
deal with the regulation of foster parent rights and responsibilities), notes 36-42 (discussing the
relevant sections of the Illinois Administrative Code detailing the requirements of licensing and
maintaining a foster home).
231. Supra Part II.A (discussing the Illinois Compiled Statutes and the Illinois Administrative
Code, which impose strict regulations on foster parent homes and behavior toward foster
children).
232. Hoomani & Woodell, supra note 226, at 453; March, supra note 73, at 486.
233. Supra Part H.A. 1 (discussing the terms of the foster parent-child relationship established
within the statutes and codes); supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant
code provisions and providing relevant definitions to help determine whether foster parents are
entitled to parental immunity).
234. Hoomani & Woodell, supra note 226, at 472-73.
235. See id. at 464 n.126. States that have limited the Goller standard, allowing parental
immunity for those acts that would be done by "the reasonably prudent parent" allow a parent to
exercise authority (such as spanking a child) without any potential liability. Id. at 463-64. In
Illinois, under either the Goller standard or the "reasonably prudent parent" standard, the Illinois
Administrative Code prohibits foster parents from inflicting corporal punishment, as well as a
variety of other forms of punishment. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402.21 (c)-(i) (2000). If
foster parents are restricted from engaging in even what is considered the most basic form of
parental discretion, it is inconsistent that they would be granted parental immunity based upon
these same policies.
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2. The Majority Disregarded the Accepted Requirements of In Loco
Parentis
Fundamental to the majority's faulty decision to grant foster parents
parental immunity was its statement that foster parents stand in loco
parentis.236  To arrive at this conclusion, the majority disregarded the
accepted definition and standards of in loco parentis.237  Central to in
loco parentis status is financial responsibility for the children. 238  The
majority did not assert that foster parents assume financial responsibility
for the children in their care, but rather confirmed that foster parents
receive compensation for their participation. 239 Prior to the majority's
decision in Nichol, no Illinois court had granted in loco parentis status
to an individual who had not assumed both the financial responsibility
for the child and the care required of a permanent caregiver.240 Further,
both federal and state law mandate that foster parents may not assume
financial responsibility and must receive reimbursement for any costs
incurred. 241 In light of these established principles and federal and state
mandates, there is no basis upon which the majority could find foster
parents in loco parentis.
The majority incorrectly pointed to the grant of in loco parentis status
on teachers to support its contention that foster parents are entitled to
parental immunity. 242  While the majority cited the fact that teachers,
whose positions are arguably similar to that of foster parents, are
granted in loco parentis status, it ignored the critical fact that teachers
are entitled to this status only because of an express grant through the
"School Code." 243  Without a provision similar to that of the "School
236. Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 590 (Ill. 2000); supra notes 161-64 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's reasoning that foster parents are like teachers, who are granted in
loco parentis status, and that therefore, foster parents should also receive in loco parentis status).
237. Supra note 69 (defining in loco parentis), notes 161-64 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority's reasoning that foster parents are in loco parentis and therefore entitled
to parental immunity).
238. Supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing that a long-standing principle of
in loco parentis is the assumption of financial responsibility for the child, and not just affection
and care of the child).
239. Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 589.
240. Busillo v. Hetzel, 374 N.E.2d 1090, 1091 (Il. App. Ct. 1978); supra notes 92-93
(discussing the reasoning and holding Busillo).
241. Supra notes 34-35 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994) and 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-
15(4) (1998), both of which mandate reimbursement for expenses related to the care of a foster
child); see also Nichol, 735 N.E.2d at 589 (stating foster parent compensation as a given fact).
242. Supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's analogy of foster
parents to teachers for the purposes of concluding that foster parents stand in loco parentis).
243. Gerrity v. Beatty, 373 N.E.2d 1323, 1324 (II1. 1978). Central to understanding the
2001]
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Code," the majority's extension of in loco parentis status is without
support.24
4
V. IMPACT
Although the Illinois Supreme Court's decision on the issue of
sovereign immunity provides sound policy, its rationale lacks the clarity
necessary to provide guidance for future courts facing similar issues.
The majority's decision to grant foster parents limited parental
immunity, while express in this particular case, leaves nothing but
ambiguity as its legacy. This decision highlights the need for the
clarification necessary to implement the majority's holding. 245  While
the court deemed sovereign immunity inappropriate and parental
immunity potentially appropriate, its decision neglects larger issues and
requires further clarification.
A. Revising Sovereign Immunity
The consistent flaw throughout the majority's decision is the reliance
on a case-by-case analysis. 246 The majority's decision fails to consider
that there are fundamental similarities in the relationship between every
foster parent and every foster child.247 Within the context of this
uniformity, the Illinois Supreme Court should have extended its holding
to all cases involving foster parents. 248 Such an act would answer any
future questions of whether foster parents are entitled to sovereign
immunity without any analysis of the foster parents' licensing.
The majority's decision presumed that foster parents licensed by
private agencies are entitled to the representation and indemnification
distinction between the grant of in loco parentis status for teachers and foster parents is section
5/34-84a of the statute known as the "School Code," which provides parental status to teachers,
other education related employees, and any other person involved with a student if the individual
is acting to maintain discipline in the school, on the school property, or in connection with a
school related activity. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-84a (1998).
244. Infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text (discussing the detrimental impact of the
majority's decision to extend parental immunity to foster parents).
245. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform: Revolutionizing the Most
Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 23-26 (1994-95) (discussing the history
of the foster care system, the current need for reform, and the need for judicial and legislative
action).
246. Supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the majority's use of a case-by-case method of analysis,
rather than an examination of the general class of foster parents).
247. See generally 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-10 (1998); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/1-15
(1998); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402 (2000). These codes define the relationship of every
foster parent and child throughout the State of Illinois.
248. See Levesque, supra note 245, at 26-28 (discussing the need for courts to clarify the roles
and rights of foster parents).
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the Illinois Compiled Statutes confers on foster parents licensed by
DCFS. 249  The majority did not stop to consider or explain why the
provision of the Illinois Compiled Statutes providing DCFS licensed
foster parents with indemnification and representation should apply to
foster parents licensed by private agencies. 250  Assuming that the
decision to extend this protection to foster parents licensed by private
agencies complies with policies of the foster care system, the next
logical issue is the implication of state representation and
indemnification.2 5 1  While no court has specifically considered this
issue, providing foster parents with both representation and
indemnification is inconsistent with the mission statement of DCFS.2 52
The primary mission of DCFS is to protect children, but providing
foster parents with both representation and indemnification in all cases
protects foster parents from the significant financial ramifications of
committing torts upon the foster children in their care. While providing
indemnification and representation may provide an incentive for
individuals to become foster parents, 253 there must be a middle ground
between protecting the safety of foster children and the finances of
foster parents.
A possible solution to the inequity in interests created by providing
foster parents with representation and indemnification is to provide
representation without indemnification. This solution prevents foster
parents from having to incur legal costs upon the filing of a frivolous
suit or when a jury of their peers determines that they are were not
negligent in caring for their foster child.254  This solution, however,
requires that when a court or a jury decides that foster parents have not
249. Supra Part III.C and notes 147-49 (discussing the majority's application of the State
Employee Indemnification Act to the defendant foster parents, even though they were not
licensed by the state or DCFS as is required by the statutory provision).
250. Supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's conclusion that the
State Employee Indemnification Act applies to all foster parents).
251. See supra Parts III.D-E (discussing the reasoning of the dissenting opinions, both of
which were concerned with the implications of granting foster parents parental immunity for the
torts committed upon the children in their care).
252. Supra Part I and note 5 and accompanying text (stating that the mission of DCFS is to
prevent children from being subjected to any future harm at the hands of an abuser).
253. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the appellate court's reasoning in both Augsburger
cases that that failure to provide foster parents with some protection from liability will prevent the
foster parents best performance); see also supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Heiple's concerns that providing foster parents with parental immunity may prevent foster
parents from feeling any obligation to complete their responsibilities).
254. Supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing that one of the Augsburger court's
reasoning for granting parental immunity was to protect foster parents against baseless suits by
angered foster children or natural parents).
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acted with the requisite care or in the best interests of the child placed in
their care, foster parents must face the consequences. 255  This solution
would also prevent those individuals who become foster parents without
admirable intentions from becoming foster parents, as they would know
that failure to exercise reasonable care would have a direct result on
their financial situation. 256  Providing complete immunity to foster
parents could encourage foster parents to be negligent in the completion
of their responsibilities because they know that there will be no long-
term consequences for their actions. 25
7
B. Rethinking Parental Immunity
There was no sound basis for the majority's decision that foster
parents can exercise parental discretion.258  Parental immunity is
intended to create a very narrow exception for parents to avoid liability
from discretionary acts central to their role as parents.259 Widening this
doctrine to include foster parents, who are not generally intended to be
permanent figures in a child's life, is a slippery slope. The role of foster
parents is to facilitate an environment in which the child can eventually
be reunited with his or her natural parent.260 Granting parental
immunity obscures this role because the doctrine of parental immunity
implies permanency. 261  Foster parents must comply with their state
established role; to adopt the attitude of a natural parent creates a
situation in which foster parents may no longer be mindful of the
255. Supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Heiple's reasoning that a
foster parent's failure to use reasonable care should not result in immunity from liability).
256. See Foster Homes... or Warehouses?, supra note 2, at 22. The writer of this editorial
points out that there are individuals who choose to enter "the business of foster care" because of
the funds provided for each child in care. Id.
257. Supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Heiple's concern that granting
foster parents parental immunity may prevent foster parents from completing their responsibilities
to the best of their abilities).
258. Supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of discretion for
parental immunity); see also supra Parts II.D-E (discussing the dissenting justices' opinions that
the nature of the Illinois Administrative Code and Illinois Compiled Statutes precludes foster
parents from being vested with the required discretion).
259. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the reasoning of the court in Cates
to abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity for all intentional torts and for negligence, except
for conduct inherent in parent-child relationships, such as education, discipline, care and
household maintenance); see also 4 FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 71, at app.67B (listing
generally all the cases throughout the nation that have considered questions of parental immunity
and clearly showing the gradual narrowing and frequent extinction of the doctrine of parental
immunity).
260. See generally ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 315.2 (2000).
261. Supra Part II.B.I (discussing the established principles of parental immunity and the
situations in which historically parental immunity is accepted as appropriate for non-parents).
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binding state imposed administrative regulations. 262 Further, a grant of
parental immunity may eliminate the foster parents' notions that they
are accountable for their actions.
The majority's willingness to extend parental immunity to foster
parents and fundamentally change the required elements of in loco
parentis is without precedent.263 The result is a definition that requires
a case-by-case analysis and is counter-intuitive to both the principles of
judicial efficiency and stare decisis. 264 Further, the majority's failure to
apply the law it created to the facts of the Nichol case creates a vast
change in the law without providing the rationale other courts will
require to properly apply the majority's decision. 265 The result of the
majority's decision in Nichol v. Stass is the destruction of two "bright-
line" rules without clearly establishing new frameworks of analysis. As
a result, the need for further revision and clarification continues.
C. The Independent Duty of Foster Parents
Foster parents deal with children in extremely fragile conditions. 266
Foster children are forcibly removed from their natural parents by the
state because they faced an "immediate risk of harm." 267 Not only are
these children often physically injured but they also frequently face a
variety of emotional challenges. 268 Foster parents know these facts and
262. Supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Heiple's concern in his dissent
that foster parents will disregard their obligation if they assume that there are no ramifications for
failure to comply with the stated regulations).
263. Supra Part II.B (discussing the established principles and applications of parental
immunity and in loco parentis).
264. Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d 582, 590 (11. 2000) (holding that a case-by-case analysis is
required in considering parental immunity). Perhaps the only time a case-by-case analysis is
appropriate is when the foster child is permanently placed in the foster home or the foster parent
is in the process of adopting the child. In these cases, the foster parent is assuming the
responsibilities, including financial support, commensurate with the traditional definition of in
loco parentis status. Id.
265. Supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the majority's reasoning for remanding the case after
determining that parental immunity was an option available to foster parents in limited
situations); infra Part VI (discussing how the majority's decision leaves foster children, or their
estates, without recourse under the law).
266. Child Protection, supra note 5 (discussing that DCFS only removes a child from the
natural parent's home to prevent any further harm from being perpetrated on the child).
267. Id.
268. Ill. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., Foster Care, About Foster Care (2000), at
http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/aboutfc.pdf; see also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402.12 (2000)
(discussing the factors considered during the licensing process, including whether the foster
parents can adequately handle any aberrant behavior of the child placed in their care); supra notes
36-46 and accompanying text (discussing the rigorous standards imposed upon foster parents
during the licensing process and while the child is in care).
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should be required, at a minimum, to maintain the duties imposed by
general tort principles. 269 Consistent with the applicable sections of the
Second Restatement of Torts, foster parents should be required to
anticipate reasonable dangers in their home that children may
encounter. 270  Failure to prepare the home to prevent these reasonably
foreseeable injuries should result in liability, regardless of sovereign
immunity or parental immunity. Under this theory of "no excuses" for
reasonably foreseeable injuries, foster parents will not be granted
immunity for torts committed upon their foster children when the injury
could have easily been prevented. 271 This is sound policy for both the
health and safety of foster children and the desired predictability in the
law surrounding foster parents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority correctly decided that foster parents are not entitled to
sovereign immunity for the torts committed upon their foster children.
While the majority's decision on the sovereign immunity issue in
Nichol v. Stass created more questions than it answered, the majority
correctly chose foster children's rights, health, and safety over the rights
of foster parents. The majority incorrectly decided that foster parents
may be entitled to parental immunity and that foster parents do stand in
loco parentis. Although the statistics .clearly reflect that children are
exponentially more likely to be injured by a natural parent, once the
state removes a child and places him with a foster parent, the law should
first and foremost protect the interests of the child by holding those
parties who enter the child's life to a standard in which there is no room
for that child to be injured again. The court's decision in Nichol v. Stass
failed to reflect this central policy rationale and, as a result, left foster
children without the recourse to which they should be entitled.
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 339, 343B (1965) (discussing the independent
duty maintained by all possessors of land toward children, since children cannot appreciate the
danger of the environment around them).
270. Supra Part II.A.I and note 33 (providing the exact text of the Second Restatement of
Torts relevant to determine whether foster parents should be held to a duty independent of that
delegated to them as foster parents).
271. Supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the accepted principle that liability is
imposed on land owners who could have prevented a child from being injured through the use of
reasonable care); see also Baby Protectors: Bathrooms, at http://www.babypro.com/
bathrooms.html#toilet (last modified May 24, 1999) (providing information and pricing for toilet
locking devises).
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